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Abstract
We provide evidence that incumbent and entrant firms’ access to business group deep
pockets affects entry patterns in product markets. Relying on a unique French data set
on business groups, our paper shows that entry in manufacturing industries is negatively
related to the cash hoarded by incumbent-affiliated groups, and positively related to en-
trant groups’ cash. In line with theoretical predictions, we find that the impact on entry
of group cash holdings is more important in environments where financial constraints are
pronounced and in more financially dependent sectors. The cash holdings of incumbent
and entrant groups also affect the survival rate of entrants in the 3 to 5 year post-entry
window. Overall, our findings suggest that internal capital markets operate within cor-
porate groups and affect the product market behavior of affiliated firms by mitigating
financial constraints.
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1 Introduction
A vast theoretical and empirical literature has emphasized that the availability of internally
generated liquidity enhances firms’ investment capacity in environments where access to ex-
ternal funds is limited.1 Indeed, research on internal capital markets has shown that, within
multi-segment firms and business groups, investment capacity in one sector can as well be
enhanced by cash generated in other sectors.2 This suggests that firms that enjoy access to
internal capital markets can take actions that are not available to their stand-alone rivals due
to financial constraints, which would explain why group firms and conglomerates engage more
in corporate innovation (Belenzon and Berkovitz, 2010, Belenzon, Berkovitz and Bolton, 2011)
and plant acquisitions (Maksimovic and Phillips, 2008).
Although conglomerates and business groups are ubiquitous both in advanced and emerging
economies,3 the economic literature on the product market effects of groups is fairly limited.
In particular, it is not obvious how internal capital markets operating within groups affect the
competitive behavior of affiliated firms.
Our analysis sheds light on one of the channels through which groups shape the economic en-
vironment, exploring the idea that internal capital markets – by alleviating financial constraints
– enhance a firm’s actual and perceived competitive strength. We do so by investigating whether
entry in manufacturing industries is affected by the cash reserves hoarded by incumbent and
entrant groups.
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first paper that tries to assess the impact of group
cash holdings – as opposed to individual firm liquidity – on product market competition. This
gap in the literature is also due to the lack of detailed information on business group structures,
which typically take the form of pyramids and are quite hard to reconstruct. Our analysis relies
on unique information on the ownership structure of business groups and firms’ balance sheets
provided by the INSEE (Institut National de la Statistique et des Etudes Economiques). We
thus focus on the French economy, an interesting case study for our purposes: recent statistics
(Skalitz, 2002) estimate that 30 percent of French manufacturing firms are affiliated with a
group and generate 72 percent of the sales in their sectors; in our data 89 percent of the largest
incumbents in manufacturing industries belong to corporate groups, suggesting that group-
affiliated firms in France enjoy strong positions in their markets. One possible explanation for
this is that incumbents that are able to draw on group deep pockets are better able to fund
R&D, advertising and other capital expenditures that are central to the competitive game. Our
paper empirically investigates this idea focusing on the impact of group liquidity on entry.
Our first finding is that – controlling for a host of factors including incumbents’ own cash
holdings and efficiency – the liquid wealth owned by affiliated subsidiaries operating in other
markets is negatively related to entry in the incumbents’ market. This is per se a novel con-
1See Hubbard (1998) and Stein (2003) for detailed surveys of this literature.
2See among others Hoshi, Kashyap and Scharfstein (1991), Lamont (1997), and Shin and Stulz (1998).
3Recent work by ECGN (1997), La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer (1999), Claessens, Djankov and
Klapper (2000) and Khanna and Yafeh (2007) highlights the role played by diversified business groups in
various countries, including continental Europe.
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tribution – while a few papers have investigated the link between competition and business
group presence in product markets, there is little evidence relating product market dynamics
to business group characteristics.
The robust negative relationship between entry and group cash holdings that we identify
calls for further investigation, as it could be ascribed to both a financial constraint explanation
and an efficiency explanation. As suggested earlier on, it may be the case that internal capital
markets operated by cash rich groups relax financial constraints faced by affiliated units, hence
providing the latter with a competitive edge over potential entrants, who may instead have a
harder time raising capital. However, it may well be that potential entrants are scared out
of markets dominated by cash-rich groups because the latter are perceived as very efficient.
Our results suggest that the relaxation of financial constraints plays a non-negligible role in
explaining why entry is inversely related to group cash: indeed, the negative correlation survives
after controlling for several measures of efficiency.
To further explore the financial constraint explanation, we draw and take to the data two
theoretical predictions that relate the impact of group cash holdings on entry in a given industry
to the severity of financial constraints and the need for external capital that characterize that
industry. Theory suggests that the impact of internal finance – hence of group cash holdings
– on firms’ competitive strength should be more pronounced in environments where firms are
more financially constrained. In line with this prediction, we find that entry is more sensitive
to incumbent groups’ liquidity in industries where intangible assets, that sustain little external
financing, make up for a large part of firm value; by contrast, the group deep pocket effect is
absent in high tangibility industries. Group liquidity is also more relevant to entry in industries
experiencing a downturn (an event that tends to exacerbate financial constraints) with respect
to booming industries. Finally, we find that in growing and innovative industries, that are
typically associated with larger information asymmetries vis-a`-vis external financiers, the group
deep pocket effect is more pronounced than in mature and less innovative sectors.
The second prediction we test is that the effect of group cash holdings on entry should
be more pronounced in manufacturing sectors characterized by larger technological needs for
external finance, along the lines of Rajan and Zingales (1998). This rests on the argument
that financially dependent incumbents who can draw upon additional sources of funding – such
as group liquidity generated in other sectors – will be perceived as stronger competitors by
equally financially dependent, stand-alone firms. Our results support this hypothesis: entry in
financially dependent industries negatively responds to increases in group cash; by contrast,
group cash has no role in explaining entry in non-dependent industries.
Our analysis then focuses on group-backed entry. One would expect that entrant groups
compare both their financial strength and their efficiency to those of incumbent groups when
making entry decisions. Indeed, we find that entry by business groups, while being significantly
affected by relative efficiency, is also facilitated when entrant groups have piled large cash
reserves in their originating markets; this effect is more pronounced in high-growth and finan-
cially dependent industries. Also, while group-backed entry is negatively affected by incumbent
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groups’ deep pockets, this effect is smaller when entrant groups are cash-richer. Finally, we
find that entry into young industries is more facilitated by entrant groups’ cash when entering
groups are established in older sectors; this supports the idea (see Maksimovic and Phillips
2008) that internal capital markets are used by conglomerates to channel funds from mature
sectors which lack investment opportunities towards young growing sectors.
Stand-alone entrants are also discouraged by the incumbent groups’ deep pockets, although
to a lesser extent. This is in line with a pattern common to various 4-digit sectors, where several
small entrants, mostly stand-alone firms, challenge few large group-affiliated incumbents. The
significantly smaller size of stand-alone firms as opposed to group-affiliated firms may suggest
that in some industries stand-alone entrants try to exploit local market niches where they may
be shielded from the strategic moves of group-affiliated players. On the other hand, stand-alone
entrants do represent 3/4 of the entrants that exit the market within 5 years after entry. This
would rather suggest that small entrepreneurial firms have limited product market experience
to gauge their actual post-entry productivity, and may overstate their ability to withstand their
rivals’ financial muscle (Hopenhayn, 1992). Consistently with this latter explanation, we find
that the exit rate of stand-alone entrants in the 3 to 5 year window post-entry is particularly
affected by the presence of deep-pocketed groups in the market. Indeed, a 1 percent increase
in incumbent groups’ cash increases the 3-to-5 year exit rate of stand-alone entrants by 7.8%,
as opposed to a 5.8% increase in the exit rate of group-backed entrants. Moreover, contrary
to group-backed entrants, stand-alone entrants cannot rely on the liquidity provided by the
internal capital market to increase their survival rate. These findings provide further support
to the hypothesis that group deep pockets mitigate firms’ financial constraints thus enhancing
their competitive strength.
Our paper adds to the extensive body of evidence confirming that in the presence of capital
market frictions industry outcomes are affected by the financial status of market participants.4
Building a bridge between this literature and work on internal capital markets, a few theoretical
papers have recently investigated whether internal capital markets established within business
groups and multi-segment firms, by providing a source of financial slack to member units, may
turn them into stronger competitors.5 However, due to the lack of reliable data on corporate
group structures, little work has empirically explored whether and how access to internal capital
markets affects a firm’s competitive conduct. Lawrence (1991) shows that imports and entry
tend to be lower in Japanese markets where keiretsu-affiliated firms have larger market shares.
Weinstein and Yafeh (1995) find that, upon entry in a market, group-affiliated firms compete
more aggressively than stand-alone entities. Khanna and Tice (2000, 2001) find that multi-
segment incumbents responded very differently from stand-alone incumbents to Wal Mart’s
entry in the discount department store business between 1975 and 1996. However, none of the
above papers has tried to assess the impact of group financial strength on the product market
4See, among others, Chevalier (1995a and 1995b), Zingales (1998), Kovenock and Phillips (1995 and 1997),
Maksimovic and Phillips (2002), Campello (2003), Mac Kay and Phillips (2005), Bertrand, Schoar and The´smar
(2007) and Fre´sard (2009).
5See Matsusaka and Nanda (2002), Cestone and Fumagalli (2005), Faure-Grimaud and Inderst (2005) and
Mathews and Robinson (2008).
3
behavior of incumbents and their rivals.
Our paper also contributes to the literature on internal capital markets. While most em-
pirical work on the topic has made use of multi-segment firm data, a growing number of recent
papers rely, like ours, on accurate balance sheet data of group-affiliated firms, i.e. of indepen-
dent legal entities controlled by a single individual or family.6 The results we present provide
indirect evidence that French business groups operate active internal capital markets. Our find-
ings suggest that wealthy groups tend to inject liquidity towards more financially constrained
as well as more financially dependent affiliates, that as a consequence rely on a cheaper source
of capital than comparable stand-alone firms and affiliates of cash-stripped groups. This con-
firms a longstanding claim that in the presence of pronounced financial frictions conglomerates
may represent a valuable organizational form (See for instance Khanna and Palepu, 1997 and
Rajan, 2010).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the underlying theoretical
framework to be tested and discusses our empirical strategy. Section 3 describes the data set
and the variables used in the analysis, and provides descriptives statistics. Section 4 presents
the empirical results. Section 5 concludes.
2 Internal Capital Markets and Product
Market Competition
A copious literature dating back to Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen (1988) has emphasized how
the availability of internally generated cash affects firms’ real investment decisions by alleviating
their financial constraints. This suggests that firms that can rely on internal finance can take
actions and strategies that are not available to their cash-poor rivals: as recent empirical
findings suggest, this advantage is likely to be pronounced in environments where access to
external funds is limited.7
A set of recent papers builds on these theories to put forth the idea that the competitive
strength of firms may be substantially affected by their access to internal capital markets.
Cestone and Fumagalli (2005) show within a formal model that cash-rich groups can be expected
6Among the papers investigating the functioning of internal capital markets in multi-segment firms are
Lamont (1997), Shin and Stulz (1998), Rajan, Servaes and Zingales (2000), Scharftsein and Stein (2000),
and Maksimovic and Phillips (2002). Houston, James and Marcus (1997), Houston and James (1998) and
more recently Campello (2002) provide evidence that ICMs also operate within multi-bank holding companies,
whereas Perotti and Gelfer (2001), Samphantharak (2006), Gopalan, Nanda and Seru (2007), and Bertrand,
Mehta and Mullainathan (2002) find that internal assets are extensively reallocated within Russian, Thai and
Indian business groups. We refer to Stein (2003) for a more ample survey of the internal capital market literature.
7Recent work confirms the prominent role of financial constraints and internal liquidity in determining firms’
investment decisions. Campello, Graham and Harvey (2010) document that credit constrained firms planned
to dramatically cut investments in advertising, R&D and marketing (as opposed to unconstrained firms) during
the 2008 financial crisis. Moreover, a majority of corporate financial officers reported that they would turn to
internal resources (whether operating income or cash reserves), where available, to fund attractive investments.
Duchin, Ozbas and Sensoy (2010) find that the decline in corporate investment following the onset of the crisis
was greatest for firms with low cash reserves.
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to inject liquidity into those units facing higher costs of external finance.8 Due to this privileged
access to liquidity, firms affiliated with wealthy groups end up enjoying a competitive edge over
stand-alone rivals. The alleviation of financial constraints may for instance enhance group
firms’ ability to make R&D and advertising investments that are central to the competitive
race.9 Of course, if efficiency considerations drive internal capital market allocations, as the
evidence in Maksimovic and Phillips (2002) suggests, then more efficient group firms are the
ones that benefit most from this effect.
Matsusaka and Nanda (2002) unveil in contrast a commitment cost of internal capital mar-
kets: new rivals may be encouraged to enter an industry if conglomerates are expected to drain
financial resources from that sector once this is faced with more intense competition. In other
words, diversified business groups and multi-segment firms may lack – when compared to fo-
cused firms – the commitment to “stay and fight” in response to new entry. However, this
commitment cost is only likely to affect cash-poor groups, whereas affiliation with cash-rich
groups mitigates financial constraints and thus enhances a firm’s actual and perceived strength
vis-a`-vis its stand-alone rivals.10
Theory then suggests that if access to financial resources is a source of competitive strength
and internal capital markets operate within business groups, an increase in the liquid wealth
owned by groups affiliated with market incumbents should turn the latter into stronger com-
petitors. Drawing upon this setting, we derive the following testable prediction:
P1: Other things equal, a market displays lower entry rates when incumbent-affiliated sub-
sidiaries have larger cash holdings.
We next delineate in detail the empirical model the brings Prediction 1 to the data.
Basic Entry Equation
Our baseline empirical model relates, in each year, the cash holdings of groups affiliated with
market incumbents with the entry rate in that market, controlling for a list of factors that
includes incumbents’ own liquidity. Differently from the existing literature, which has focused
on the role of individual firm deep pockets, we make a distinction between an incumbent’s cash
holdings and the cash held by the rest of the group this incumbent is affiliated with. Formally,
Entryi,t = γ1TC
BG
i,t−1 + γ2TC
INC
i,t−1 + Z
INC
i,t−1λ+Xi,t−1β + αi + θt + εi,t (1)
8The main intuition behind this result is that as individual group firms have autonomous access to external
capital markets, the shadow value of internal funds is larger for units with tighter financial constraints. In
this respect, the internal capital market acts as a credit line that guarantees access to liquidity to those firms
facing a larger cost of outside finance. This argument is supported by the empirical findings in Maksimovic and
Phillips (2008) that conglomerate firms relax financial constraints faced by segments operating in industries
where access to external funding is more problematic.
9Belenzon and Berkovitz (2010) provide empirical evidence that business group affiliates engage in more
successful innovation than stand-alone firms, particularly in industries that rely more on external finance and
have a higher degree of informational asymmetries.
10See Cestone and Fumagalli (2005) for a formal derivation of this result. Faure-Grimaud and Inderst (2005)
also show within a model of product market competition and financing that access to an internal capital market
can bring along both strategic benefits and commitment costs. Mathews and Robinson (2006) build on the
trade off between flexibility and commitment to model competition between a multi-divisional corporation and
a stand-alone firm.
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where Entryi,t is the entry rate in market i at time t; the variable TC
INC
i,t−1 measures the cash
holdings of incumbents in market i at time t− 1; similarly TCBGi,t−1 measures the cash holdings
of all subsidiaries that operate in other markets and are affiliated with market i’s incumbents.11
The matrix Xi,t−1 includes sectoral controls such as the size of the market (both in levels and
in growth rates), capital intensity, return on assets (ROA) and the level of market concentration
as measured by the Herfindahl index. These are the usual suspects in the determination of entry
rates as they account for the profitability of the market, for technological barriers to entry, and
for the intensity of competition in the market. The inclusion of sector fixed effects, denoted
by αi, accounts for any time-invariant sectoral determinant of entry rates we have possibly
omitted. The matrix ZINCi,t−1 controls for time-varying characteristics of incumbent firms that
may affect entry rates among which, most notably, efficiency and business group affiliation.
Finally, θt is a full set of year dummies that takes care of aggregate shocks. All variables are
one-year lagged to account for the information set of potential entrants when the entry decision
is made. This also makes them more likely to be pre-determined at the time entry occurs.
As argued above, one could rationalize a negative correlation between entry in a given
market and group cash holdings in other markets arguing that cash rich groups relax financial
constraints faced by affiliated units, hence providing the latter with a competitive edge over
potential entrants, who may instead have a harder time raising capital. However, a negative
correlation may also be consistent with alternative interpretations that do not rely on financial
market imperfections. For instance, entrants may be scared out of markets dominated by cash-
rich groups because incumbents affiliated with deep-pocketed groups are perceived as more
efficient.
In the paper, we try to disentangle the financial constraint explanation from the efficiency
explanation in two ways. First, in equation (1) we control for the efficiency of incumbent
firms in the market to make sure that group deep pockets are not just proxying for superior
incumbent efficiency with respect to smaller entrant firms. Additionally, we investigate to
which extent efficiency and financial considerations interact in determining the competitive
strength of group affiliated firms, asking whether the group deep pocket effect is amplified for
the more efficient affiliated incumbents. If internal capital markets in business groups respond
to efficiency considerations, then the most efficient affiliated firms are the ones that see their
financial constraints alleviated (Maksimovic and Phillips, 2002 and 2008). Hence, we expect
the effect of group deep pockets on entry to be most apparent in markets where group-affiliated
incumbents are very efficient.
Secondly, we draw and put to the test two additional theoretical predictions that can be
ascribed to the financial constraint explanation. These predictions relate the product market
impact of group deep pockets to the financial constraints that are faced by firms in different
industries, as well as the external financial needs that characterize those industries.
Group Deep Pockets and External Finance
In environments where raising external funding is more problematic, access to internally gen-
11We refer the reader to Section 3.2 for a detailed description of the variables included in equation (1).
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erated cash is crucial to support corporate investment. This implies that in sectors facing
more severe financial constraints a company’s actual and perceived strength is more likely to
be enhanced by its ability to call on group cash holdings. This argument translates into the
following prediction:
P2: Holding other factors constant, the effect of group deep pockets on entry is greater in
industries facing more serious financial constraints.12
We test this prediction by splitting our market-year observations into two sub-samples
constructed on the basis of different proxies for the severity of financial frictions.13 We then
estimate equation (1) separately on the two sub-samples. Asset tangibility is a first natural
proxy for the ease of access to external capital: assets that are more tangible sustain more
external financing by increasing the value that can be pledged to creditors in default states.
As credit constraints are alleviated, internal liquidity becomes less central to a company’s
competitive strength.14 We therefore expect the group deep-pocket effect to be less important
in industries characterized by a high proportion of tangible assets.
Financial constraints are also likely to be exacerbated during recessions, whereas booms
are usually associated with looser credit conditions.15 One would then expect that entrants’
disadvantage vis-a`-vis deep-pocketed incumbent groups should shrink in boom times. In line
with this intuition, for each sector we identify periods of boom and of periods of bust, and we
expect the group deep pocket effect to be larger in the sub-sample of market-year observations
that experience a downturn.
Financial constraints also tend to be more prevalent in the growth stage of the industry
life cycle and in more innovative industries, as various factors limit the payouts that can be
credibly pledged to external financiers. In growing and innovative industries, most of a firm’s
value derives from future, yet unexploited business opportunities rather than from predictable
income streams and hard, collateralizable assets; furthermore, informational asymmetries be-
tween managers and outside investors tend to be larger with respect to more mature industries,
which may exacerbate credit rationing. Indeed, Maksimovic and Phillips (2008) show that the
effect of conglomerate status on plant acquisitions is stronger in growing industries, suggesting
that internal capital markets play an important role in relaxing financial constraints in the
early stages of the industry life cycle. In a similar spirit, we expect that the group deep-pocket
12A further theoretical argument behind Prediction 2 rests on the efficient functioning of internal capital
markets in business groups. If parent companies aim at maximizing group value, funds should be optimally
reallocated from units that face a lower cost of capital towards more financially constrained units (see Cestone
and Fumagalli, 2005), a prediction that is corroborated by recent empirical evidence in Gopalan, Nanda and Seru
(2007). Of course, this reinforces the prediction that firms operating in financially constrained environments
enjoy larger strategic benefits from access to internal capital markets.
13See Section 4.2.1 for details on the construction of these proxies.
14The corporate finance literature has exploited in different ways the idea that tangible assets can reduce the
severity of financial constraints. Almeida and Campello (2007) find for instance that the sensitivity of corporate
investment to cash flow increases with asset tangibility for those firms that are most likely to be constrained.
Braun and Larrain (2005) show that the response of financially dependent industries to negative shocks is less
pronounced for higher tangibility industries.
15Braun and Larrain (2005) show that financially dependent industries are hit harder during recessions, thus
providing indirect evidence that credit conditions worsen in downturns.
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effect should be stronger in markets where real sales have grown more during our sample pe-
riod, 1995-2004. To complement our results on growth industries we also identify innovative
industries in our sample.16 We classify sectors based on the number of patents awarded by
the European Patent Office to French firms, and regard as innovative those sectors where the
number of patents awarded over the entire sample period has grown relatively more. In line
with Prediction 2, we expect group deep pockets to have a more negative effect on entry in
more innovative sectors.
We then move on to relate the group deep pocket effect to firms’ financial dependence.
The latter has to do with external financial needs, namely a firm’s intrinsic demand for outside
funding as driven by the mismatch between its capital expenditures and its internally generated
cash, as opposed to the firm’s ability to raise external finance. A vast literature starting with
Rajan and Zingales (1998) has highlighted that access to finance (whether external or internally
generated) has more significant real effects in financially dependent industries. One would then
expect competition in financially dependent industries to be more affected by the presence of
cash-rich incumbents. This leads us to test the following prediction:
P3: Ceteris paribus, the effect of group deep pockets on entry is greater in more financially
dependent industries.
In order to identify industries whose intrinsic, technologically driven (unobservable) demand
for external funds is larger, we follow Rajan and Zingales (1998) and gauge it by the reliance
on external finance of U.S. listed firms in the Compustat database.17 We expect group deep
pockets to discourage firms’ entry more in the sub-sample of industries that are more dependent
on external funds.18
Group-Backed Entry and Entrant Groups Cash
If access to group cash provides firms with a competitive edge by mitigating their financial
constraints, one would expect that own deep pockets can as well help business groups make
their way into new markets. Indeed, group entry in financially constrained or in financially
dependent industries can be particularly facilitated by the entrant groups’ cash reserves. This
is summarized in Prediction 4:
P4: Other things equal, the rate of (group-backed) entry into a market is larger when entrants
are affiliated with cash-richer groups. The positive effect of entrant groups’ cash on entry is
more pronounced when external finance is costly to raise and in financially dependent industries.
To test this prediction, in section 4.3. we estimate a system of equations in which the
16Several papers have provided indirect evidence of severe financial constraints in innovative industries, by
examining the sensitivity of R&D investment to cash flow shocks (see Hall 2009 for a comprehensive survey).
More recent evidence relies instead on firms’ own assessment of financial constraints: Hajivassiliou and Savignac
(2008) document that in French manufacturing industries innovative firms are more likely to report difficulties
in raising external capital.
17The construction of this index will be illustrated more extensively in Section 4.2.2.
18The corporate finance literature has highlighted that besides facing more serious financial constraints,
innovative industries are as well more financially dependent. This is because R&D investments call for large
capital expenditures but take a considerable amount of time before cash flows can be harvested. Hence, our
split regressions on innovative sectors also provide a test to Prediction 3.
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dependent variables are the stand-alone and the group-backed entry rate – with entrant groups’
cash added as a control in the group-backed entry equation. The system is also estimated
separately on the different sub-samples used to verify Predictions 2 and 3.
Exit of Recent Entrants and Groups Cash
The previous theoretical considerations also suggest that while recent entrants should find it
more difficult to survive on the market when facing established rivals affiliated with cash-rich
groups, they should be better equipped to survive when they are backed by cash-rich groups.
This is summarized in Prediction 5:
P5: Holding other factor constant, the rate of exit of recent entrants is larger when estab-
lished firms are affiliated with cash-richer groups. The rate of exit of affiliated recent entrants
is lower when these are backed by cash-richer groups.
To test this prediction, in section 4.4 we estimate the impact of entrants and incumbents
group cash on the exit rates of stand-alone and affiliated recent entrants.
We now turn to the description of the data.
3 Data
3.1 Data sources
Empirical investigation on the relationship between ICM activity in business groups and entry
requires reliable and extensive information not only on product markets and on the financial
wealth of individual firms, but also on firm ownership status. The latter is needed to recover
the structure and characteristics of business groups controlling individual firms. We obtain this
information from the following data-sets.
As in Bertrand, Schoar and The´smar (2007), we use the firm- and industry-level data
sets based on accounting data extracted from tax files that the French Fiscal Administration
(Direction Ge´ne´rale des Impoˆts) collects. The accounting information available covers all French
firms, regardless of ownership, whose annual sales exceed 100,000 Euros in the service sector
and 200,000 Euros in other sectors. Above these thresholds firms are required to fill in a detailed
balance sheet and profit statement. Instead, smaller firms are subject to a simplified tax regime.
The tax files also include four-digit industry classification codes similar to the U.S. ISIC coding
system and unique firm identifiers allowing to track firms over time. Firm-level employment
figures are also provided and are especially reliable since cross-checked with information from
employer labor tax reports. Since each firm can be active in several markets, we cross the
fiscal data set with an extensive yearly survey by the Ministry of Industry (“Enqueˆte Annuelle
des Entreprises”). The survey is exhaustive for French firms with more than 20 workers and
contains information on the different markets in which a firm operates. Many firms with less
than 20 workers are sampled, but the survey does not cover the entire population. The data,
then, include the vast majority of French firms and span over the period 1995-2004.
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The identification of business group structures is based on a yearly survey by INSEE called
“Enqueˆte Liasons Financieres” (LIFI). It covers all economic activities but restricts its attention
to firms which either employ more than 500 employees, or generate more than 60 Million Euros
of revenues, or hold more than 1.2 Million Euros of traded shares. However since 1998 the
survey is crossed with information from Bureau Van Dijk and thus covers almost the whole
economy. The LIFI survey contains information which makes it a unique data set to study the
effects of business group activity. First, besides providing information on direct financial links
between firms, it also accounts for indirect stakes and cross-ownerships when identifying the
head of the group. This is important as it allows to precisely reconstruct the group structure
even in the presence of pyramids. Secondly, the LIFI survey allows to correctly account for
the creation, merger and disappearance of business groups and avoids misclassifying as new a
pre-existing business group whose group head has changed. This is done by looking at whether
most of the activities of the pre-existing group (according to employment) keep existing under
the new head of group.19 These two features allow to obtain a reliable account of the structure
of business groups in the French economy and, as a consequence, reliable measures of our key
variable, the cash holdings of business groups.
Our data source (LIFI) defines a group as a set of firms controlled, directly or indirectly,
by the same entity (the head of the group). The survey relies on a formal definition of direct
control, requiring that a firm holds at least 50 percent of the voting rights in another firm’s
general assembly. This is in principle a very tight threshold, as in the presence of dispersed
minority shareholders real control can be achieved with substantially lower equity stakes.20
However, we do not expect this to be a major source of bias in our sample as most French
firms are private and ownership concentration is strong even among listed firms.21 Finally, let
us stress again that since both indirect control and cross-ownerships are accounted for in the
LIFI, a group firm need not be directly controlled with a majority stake by the head of the
group.
Our product market definition coincides with the industry as defined by the four-digit
classification code. This is the highest level of disaggregation allowed by the French Activity
Classification (1993 Nomenclatures d’Activitite´ Franc¸aise). Our geographical market definition
is France. For each year and each market we identify entrants and incumbents. We focus
on entry in the manufacturing industry, thereby excluding retailing and service industries,
19This is particularly important as in the LIFI dataset there are as much as 25,000 changes of the head of
the group between 1995 and 2004.
20The literature reconstructing corporate ownership and control has used different definitions of real control,
with thresholds ranging from 5 percent to 33 percent (which in most countries, included France, is the ownership
stake that would spur a mandatory public offer). Indeed, as emphasized by Franks, Mayer and Rossi (2009) it is
quite natural to have more than one definition of ownership, with differently defined groups having control over
different actions. Note that if control is formally defined as ownership of a majority stake as in our dataset, it
is quite reasonable to assume that resources can be reallocated from one firm to another without encountering
the opposition of minority shareholders.
21In their overview of ownership structures and voting power in France, Bloch and Kremp (1999) show
that ownership concentration is pervasive: for non-listed companies with more than 500 employees the main
shareholder’s ownership stake is 88%. The degree of ownership concentration is slightly lower for listed companies
but still above 50 percent in most cases.
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because firms active in these sectors typically compete on geographical markets which are
narrower than the national one. Also, we exclude the financial sector from the sample, as well
as regulated sectors. Finally, we delete as outliers firm-year observations whose financial ratios
(Debt/Assets, ROA, Net Liquid Assets/Assets, Cash Flow/Assets) fall outside a multiple of five
of the interquartile range. These restrictions leave us with a sample of approximately 70,000
firms per year that we collapse into 3083 market-year observations.
3.2 Definition of Variables
Entry Rates
We define as entrants in market i at time t all firms that appear at time t and were not active
at time t − 1. We measure entry in market i and year t (Entryi,t) as the ratio of total sales
of entrant firms to total sales in the market. Differently stated, in order to account for size,
we weight entry rates (defined as number of entrants over total number of firms) by sales.
Notice that we are able to accurately measure entry by multidivisional firms since the “Enqueˆte
Annuelle des Entreprises” includes detailed information on market dedicated sales for each
segment of a firm.
Market Characteristics
We first identify all firms that operate in market i at time t. Among these, we define as
incumbents those firms that are not entering the market in the given year. We then compute
market shares in terms of sales of each incumbent firm and use those market shares as weights
in the computation of market averages of the following variables.
The first variable, Incumbent Total Cash (TCINC), is meant to reflect “the size of incum-
bents’ pockets”. We measure each incumbent’s cash holdings as the sum of its net liquid assets
(defined as current assets minus current liabilities minus inventories) and its operating cash
flow corrected by changes in working capital. The first is a stock measure of all the assets that
can be liquidated reasonably quickly, but it ignores all recent cash flow that is immediately
invested and never shows up in the end-of-period stock variable. The addition of cash flow
allows to account for changes in internal funds (see also Cleary, Povel and Raith, 1999). Note
that we use cash flow from operations rather than free cash flow, so as to have a measure
of additional internal resources accruing to the firm which is not affected by investment deci-
sions. The market-level variable Incumbent Total Cash is (the log of) the weighted average of
incumbents’ cash holdings.22
The second variable, BG Affiliation, also refers to incumbent firms. It represents the market
share of group-affiliated incumbents in the market. In the regression analysis this variable
accounts for the (average) effect of business group presence on entry.
Finally, we measure Efficiency of incumbent firms in market i and year t as the weighted
average of incumbents’ Total Factor Productivity (TFP). TFP can be estimated as the deviation
22Saled-based weighted averages are meant to capture the idea that larger incumbents are more likely to affect
market entry. Results are robust to alternative weighting schemes: for this, we refer the reader to the working
paper version of this article (CEPR-Discussion Paper 7184).
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Figure 1: Olley and Pakes TFP estimates
between observed output and predicted output, where predicted output is obtained from the
direct estimation of a production function. OLS estimates suffer from problems of simultaneity
and selection, because productivity shocks affect not only output but also the firm’s input
choices and the decision to stay in the market. We therefore exploit a semi-parametric method
introduced by Olley and Pakes (1996) which accounts for both problems, thereby allowing one
to estimate the production function parameters consistently and to obtain reliable productivity
estimates.23 In estimating TFP we exploit the firm-level dimension of our dataset using more
than 226000 firm-year observations for incumbent firms. We obtain a labour coefficient β = 0.79
(with standard error 0.0009) and a capital coefficient α = 0.18 (with standard error 0.002).24
We also introduce a measure of dispersion of incumbents’ efficiency in market i at year t,
that we call Relative Efficiency. When making entry decisions, firms try to anticipate whether
their efficiency level will be high enough to survive in the market. To form expectations on this,
firms look not only at the average level of efficiency in the market but also at its dispersion.
For a given average, the higher the dispersion of efficiency, the more likely that a low-efficiency
entrant will be able to survive. Figure 1 shows that, in our data, efficiency is increasing in size
(measured by assets) and, conditional on size, is larger for affiliated firms. Hence, we build our
23We refer to Appendix A.1 for a more detailed description of the procedure to estimate TFP.
24These estimates are in line with recent evidence from Cingano and Schivardi (2004) on Italian firms who,
using the same methodology, estimate the contribution of labour and capital to be approximately 0.7 and 0.3
in most manufacturing industries. Similar to their study, our estimates are also indicative of constant return
to scale. Pavcnik (2002) also estimates TFP using the Olley and Pakes methodology on a sample of Chilean
manufacturing firms, finding 0.08 for the capital coefficient.
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measure of relative efficiency by classifying as strong rivals the affiliated firms belonging to the
top quartile of the distribution of affiliated firms’ size, whereas weaker firms are the stand-alone
firms belonging to the bottom quartile of the distribution of their size. Our Relative Efficiency
measure is given by the ratio between the TFP of large affiliated incumbents and the TFP of
small stand-alone incumbents.
The remaining variables refer to all firms in the market. We proxy technological character-
istics of a given market in a given year by the weighted average of the capital intensity of all
firms that operate in the market, where capital intensity is computed as the ratio of fixed assets
over output (Capital Intensity). Profitability of market i in year t is the weighted average of
the return on assets (ROA) of all firms present in market i and year t. We proxy access to
credit in a given market/year using the weighted average of the ratio of tangible assets to total
assets (Tangibility). The size of the market (Size) is measured as the (log of) total sales, and
the growth rate of the market (∆ Size) as the change in market size from t − 1 to t. Finally,
concentration in a market is proxied by the Herfindahl index (HHI), while the age of industry
i in year t (Age) is measured as the average age of the firms that operate in that industry. Firm
age is computed on the basis of the date of firm creation reported in the balance sheet statement.
Business Group Characteristics
For each incumbent in market i and year t we identify the group the incumbent is affiliated
with (if any). Even though we focus on entry in manufacturing industries, we reconstruct
groups considering affiliated firms operating in any sector. Based on this, we measure business
group characteristics among which group cash holdings. For each market, we average the
characteristics of group affiliated firms using as weights their market shares.
BG Total Cash (TCBG) is defined as the total cash held by an incumbent-affiliated group.
This is computed by adding all the group subsidiaries’ cash holdings, excluding the cash held
by the incumbent.
As a proxy for the intensity of ICM activity, we consider the number of financial intermedi-
aries owned by a group (Financial Intermediaries). Further group characteristics include Loans
of Inc. From BG. This is computed as the weighted average of loans granted to incumbents by
other members of the affiliated group, divided by the incumbents’ total assets.
Finally, we identify the group each entrant in market i at year t is affiliated with. We
compute Entrant BG Total Cash (TCBGE) as the total cash held by all group units, excluding
the entrant unit. Also, to take into account how the efficiency of established groups compares
to that of entrant groups, we compute the ratio between the two: Inc BG Eff./Entr. BG Eff.
(Reff).
3.3 Descriptive Statistics
Entry rates
Table 1 shows descriptive statistics on entry. The first three rows present the number of
entrant firms. On average, 46.6 firms enter a market in a given year. However, consistent with
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evidence by Dunne, Roberts and Samuelson (1988) we find that entrant firms account, most of
the time, for only a small fraction of market sales. Indeed, entrants with market shares above
1 % are rare (on average only slightly more than 2), and entrants that cover more than 5 % of
the market in the first year of their existence are even more infrequent (on average only about
0.5). The number of incumbents in a given market exhibits a similar pattern: high absolute
number of firms, but only a small fraction with significant market shares.
The last four rows of Table 1 report entry rates into manufacturing activities weighted by
sales. We find that despite the high heterogeneity in the size of entrants, (average) entry rates
display relatively low dispersion around a median of 11.6%, the 25th percentile being 5.6% and
the 75th percentile 19.9%. The magnitude of entry rates in the manufacturing sector is close to
the figures reported by Aghion, Fally and Scarpetta (2007) and Dunne, Roberts and Samuelson
(1988). We also observe that most of the entry rate is accounted for by group-backed entrants
(11.6% out of 16%).
The table also shows that sectoral business cycles affect entry rates. On average, entry
rates are close to 20% when sectors experience positive demand shocks, and decrease to 13.3%
when sectors experience downturns. Our data (not reported in the Table) also indicate that
entrants tend to be larger during sectoral booms than in recessions: the (unweighted) average
of entrants’ employment is 238 during booms while it decreases to 123 during recessions. A
similar pattern emerges looking at assets. Additionally, during sectoral recessions our measure
of Relative Efficiency appears to be lower than during sectoral booms: the mean value is 1.18 in
the former case, whereas it is 1.21 in the latter.25 This suggests that during sectoral recessions
the least efficient firms are unable to survive, hence the dispersion of incumbents’ efficiency
tends to decrease.
Entry rates vary considerably across 4-digit sectors experiencing a boom (or a bust), as
shown in Table 2. For each year the table displays the average entry rate in all sectors experi-
encing a boom (Panel A) and a bust (Panel B) within the two-digit aggregation indicated in
each row. In booms, entry rates range from 5.4% in the manufacture of clocks and watches
(2-digit code 33) in 1999, to 36.9% in the production of ships for civil purposes (2-digit code
35) in 2002, and to 53% in electricity distribution and control apparatus (2-digit code 31) in
2004. Similarly, in sectors experiencing a bust, entry rates range from tiny values - such as 0.1%
in the production of lead, zinc and tin (2-digit code 27) in 2003, to 30% in computer media
(2-digit code 22) in 2002. Such a variability is not surprising if one takes into account that
we identify booms and busts as deviations from each 4-digit sector own trend. Finally, Table 3
shows that booms and busts occur in different years and different sectors. This confirms that
our identification of booms and busts captures sector-specific cycles and not (only) aggregate
shocks. We therefore turn our attention to investigating the characteristics of sectors displaying
high entry rates (low-entry rates) during our sample period.
25The difference -0.03 has a standard error of 0.008 and is therefore different from zero at any conventional
level of significance.
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High-Entry versus Low-Entry Industries
In Table 4 we provide information about the industries displaying the highest (lowest) entry
rates. Across the top 10 entry industries, the average entry rate over the sample period ranges
between 25.6% and 39%,26 yet for each of these sectors entry varies substantially from year
to year as indicated by the high dispersion around the average (see standard deviations in
parentheses). Indeed, unreported statistics suggest that the more dynamic sectors experience
windows of opportunity lasting 1 to 3 years when new entrants may contribute up to 80 percent
of industry sales, preceded or followed by less active periods when entry rates may drop to less
than 1 percent. Conversely, for our 10 low-entry industries the entry rate displays less variability
within the sample period, and on average ranges between 1% (manufacture of cast iron tubes)
and 4.5% (manufacture of plaster).
Among high-entry industries we observe two different patterns of entry. For instance, the
manufacture of bakery products is characterized by a large number of entrants (on average 95
each year), most of whom (91) account for a very small percentage of industry sales. This
seems to be a common feature of dynamic sectors within the French food industry: the wine
industry, with a 29% entry rate, has an average yearly number of 59 entrants, only 7 of whom
hold a market share larger than 1% in their first year of existence. Instead in other high-entry
industries, such as the manufacture and repair of warships, we observe much fewer but larger
entrants – on average 3 yearly entrants account for a 25.6% entry rate.
Group-affiliated entrants in both high and low-entry industries account for a substantial
part of the entry rate – 52% on average and as large as 81% in the manufacture and repair of
warships, but on average represent a minority of the entrant firms (33%). New entry is thus
made up by a small number of large affiliated entrants and several small, stand-alone entrants.
This pattern is exemplified by the medical imaging equipment sector, where only 20% of the
(average) 16 yearly entrant firms are group affiliated, yet they account for 63% of the entry rate
– the remaining 80% are stand-alone entrants that operate on a much smaller scale.27 A similar
pattern emerges when looking at incumbent firms in both high-entry and low-entry sectors,
as shown in the top panel of Table 5: many small stand-alone incumbents and few group-
affiliated incumbents that are larger and account for most of the industry sales. The differences
between business group entrants/incumbents and their stand-alone counterparts deserve thus
some attention, and are explored further on in the paper.
Table 5 provides more information on entrants and incumbents in high and low entry in-
dustries. The picture emerging from the top 10 and bottom 10 industries as ranked by entry
rates (rows 1 and 2) is confirmed once we describe industries in the top and bottom decile of
the entry rate (rows 3 and 4). As expected, firms in high-entry industries are younger and
more engaged in innovation (with patents growing on average at a yearly rate of 84%) than
firms in low-entry industries.28 High-entry industries are also less capital-intensive and less
26These figures are in line with those obtained by Dunne et al. (1988) for industries in the top decile of entry.
27Stand-alone entrants in the medical imaging equipment sector employed on average 10 employees in their
first year of existence, as opposed to the 1927 employees of group-affiliated entrants.
28Among the top entry industries, the medical imaging equipment sector, with an average firm age of 15
years, has witnessed the steepest yearly increase in patents. This contrasts starkly with low-entry sectors in the
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concentrated than low-entry industries.
Turning to group cash hoarding, we observe that in high-entry sectors, cash-richer groups
fuel entry as opposed to groups entering low-entry sectors. Finally, incumbent groups are
significantly cash-richer than entrant groups, a difference that seems to be more pronounced in
low-entry sectors.
To dig into the relationship between cash and group or stand-alone entry, we now examine
the characteristics of entrants in the sample and compare them to those of incumbents, distin-
guishing between business-group affiliated and stand-alone firms (Table 6). Table 7 presents
an even finer disaggregation, distinguishing between sectors in which incumbents are affiliated
with cash-rich and sectors in which incumbents are affiliated with cash-poor groups.
Entrants and Incumbents
Table 6 compares the characteristics of entrants and incumbent firms distinguishing between
group-affiliated and stand-alone firms.
Columns (1) and (4) reveal that incumbent firms tend to own more assets and to employ
more workers than entrants. Incumbents are slightly more productive in terms of value added
per worker while total factor productivity is similar in the two groups.29 In the first year
of activity entrants hold little cash (indeed negative at the median), while incumbents’ cash
holdings are positive. Finally, the last rows of columns (2) and (5) shows that incumbents tend
to be affiliated with wealthier business groups than entrants.
Columns (2)-(3) and (5)-(6) reveal that the differences between stand-alone and group-
affiliated firms are even more pronounced. Affiliated firms are significantly larger than stand-
alones both in terms of assets and employment. They produce more value added per worker than
stand-alone firms and their TFP is larger (at least for entrants).30 Finally, affiliated incumbents
own a larger stock of liquid assets than their stand-alone counterparts. Interestingly, affiliated
entrants display negative liquid wealth more than stand-alone entrants do; this seems to suggest
that group affiliation favors entry into sectors where set up costs are large while investment
projects take time to generate cash flows.
Overall, business group affiliation seems to be associated with competitive strength. To
explore this idea, Table 7 compares markets where incumbents are affiliated with cash-rich and
cash-poor groups. More precisely, we denote as High BG Cash those markets where incumbents
are affiliated with groups whose liquid wealth is above the median; Low BG Cash denotes
instead markets where incumbent groups’ liquid wealth is below the median. The first part of
Panel A shows that (unconditional) entry rates are similar across the two groups of markets
3-digit NAF code 265, such as plaster (265E) and lime (265C), where the average firm age is respectively 23
and 29 years, and patent growth has been null.
29As illustrated in Section 3.2 we estimate firm-level TFP using the methodology proposed by Olley and
Pakes (1996). Such a methodology does not allow to estimate TFP of entrants, as it requires information on
lagged values of inputs not available for the first year of a firm’s activity. As a proxy for entrants’ TFP we
therefore consider TFP in the year posterior to entry, which is defined only for the entrants that are still active
in the second year.
30The difference in (average) TFP between stand-alone and affiliated entrants is -0.025 with a standard error
of 0.013 which implies significance at 7.7%.
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at the median. However, the second part of Panel A shows that in High BG Cash markets,
affiliated incumbents represent 82.3% of market sales, while in Low BG Cash markets the
market share of affiliated incumbents is 62.9 %. A possible interpretation of this finding is that
affiliation with cash-rich groups provides incumbents with a stronger competitive edge, thereby
making the competitive environment tougher for non-affiliated firms. Consistently, the third
part of Panel A shows that in High BG Cash markets a larger percentage of entrants is backed
by a business group (68.8% as opposed to 49.7% in Low BG Cash markets).
Panel B of Table 7 compares group-affiliated and stand-alone entrants and incumbents in
High BG Cash and Low BG Cash markets. In High BG Cash markets, affiliated incumbents and
entrants are much larger, produce more value added per worker, and are more productive than
their counterparts in Low BG Cash markets.31 A similar pattern emerges for the other market
participants, stand-alone incumbents and entrants.32 The picture emerging from this table
suggests that competition is more intense in High BG Cash markets, leading to the selection
of larger and more efficient entrants and incumbents.
Portfolio of industries
Tables 8 and 9 describe the portfolio of industries in which French business groups oper-
ate. The overall picture is that French groups diversify their activity between services and
manufacturing but, within manufacturing, they operate in very similar industries.33
Table 8 (panel A) indicates that in French groups, on average, 31.4% of units operate
outside manufacturing. However, within each group most manufacturing units operate in the
same 3-digit sector. For each group, we compute a HHI-type index – the sum of the squared
values of the shares of (manufacturing) units active in each 3-digit sector. The average value
of the index is extremely high (0.899) and increases by a modest amount when one measures
concentration at the 2-digit level. We also compute the shares of (manufacturing) units within
a group that are active in the same 3-digit sector. The average value turns out to be as high as
76.1%, while the average share of the units active in the same 2-digit but not same 3-digit sector
amounts only to 7.25%. Hence, groups focus in closely related manufacturing industries, and
mostly diversify outside manufacturing. For instance, we observe mixed (financial) services-
manufacturing groups whose manufacturing units are mainly active in the dairy industry (fresh
milk, cheese, butter, ice-creams), with only a few units in other food industries such as corn-
based products or fruit-based products. This pattern suggests that groups tend to combine the
benefits of diversification (insurance against idiosyncratic shocks, larger scope for ICM activity)
with the ability to exploit skills that are common to closely related manufacturing activities.
31The difference in TFP of affiliated incumbents between High and Low BG cash markets is -0.245, and is
different from zero at any conventional level of significance, the standard error being 0.018.
32The difference in TFP of stand-alone incumbents between High and Low-BG cash market is -0.244 with a
standard error of 0.018. The figure for entrants is a very similar -0.248 with a standard error of 0.018. Both
are different from zero at any conventional level of significance.
33This is in line with recent evidence by Hoberg and Phillips (2012) that US conglomerates tend to operate in
industry pairs that are close to each other in the product space. Hoberg and Phillips’ spatial representation of
the product market is derived from a text-based analysis of business descriptions from 10-Ks filed yearly with
the SEC, hence it accommodates changes that are not captured by existing industry classifications.
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Groups affiliated to new entrants exhibit the same feature: on average, 32.8% of group units
operate outside manufacturing; 74.2% of manufacturing units belong to the same 3-digit sector
as the entrant, while only 7.6% belong to the same 2-digit but not to the same 3-digit sector as
the entrant. This suggests again that groups tend to expand into manufacturing sectors that are
close to those where they are already active. Interestingly, in entrant groups the units outside
manufacturing represent slightly more than 30% of the total number of units, but account for
57% of the group’s cash.
French groups tend to be homogeneous also along other dimensions. Panel B of table 8
shows that most of the (manufacturing) units in a group are active in industries of similar age
– the average share of units active in sectors belonging to the same age decile is 75.6% and
the average HHI (based on the shares of units within a group active in sectors belonging to
each age decile) is 0.888. In line with this, we observe that entrant groups tend to enter into
manufacturing industries of similar maturity as their core industry: on average, 72.8% of group
units belong to the same age decile as the entrant. However, we should emphasize that in groups
entering for the first time into young industries (i.e. industries belonging to the first age decile,
which include the recycling of non-metal waste, the manufacture of electronic components, of
medical and surgical equipment and of magnetic/optical readers and writers), 65% of affiliated
units belong to the same age decile as the entrant, yet they only account for 44% of the total
cash held in manufacturing (unreported statistics available upon request). This suggests that
groups may use the cash hoarded within their older existing businesses to subsidize entry into
young industries. We investigate this issue in section 4.3 (see Table 16).
On a similar note, Table 9 shows that in French groups manufacturing units tend to be
clustered in similar industries in terms of growth opportunities (panel A) and innovation in-
tensity (panel B). On average, 76.2% of manufacturing units in a group are active in industries
belonging to the same decile in terms of long-run growth (78.9% when we classify industries
based on innovation intensity). Consistently, for groups entering a given industry, 73.5% of
(manufacturing) units operate in industries belonging to same long-run growth decile (77%
when we consider innovation activity).
4 Results
4.1 Deep Pockets, Business Group Affiliation and Entry
Table 10 starts addressing the main question of the paper. We first investigate whether in-
cumbents’ affiliation with a business group per se affects entry in a given market. Table 10,
column (1) presents results from our base regression where we relate entry rates to market
characteristics and to the market share held by group-affiliated incumbents (BG Affiliation),
not controlling yet for firms’ or groups’ liquidity.34 The coefficient of BG Affiliation is negative
34In all regressions we cluster standard errors at the 3SIC sector level in order to account for potential
intra-market correlation of the error term.
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and statistically significant at standard levels, confirming previous evidence that the presence
of business groups discourages market entry (see e.g., Lawrence, 1991).
Both our measures of efficiency, average and relative efficiency, instead turn out to be in-
significant. We do not see this as evidence that efficiency is irrelevant for market entry. Rather,
entry is likely to be mostly determined by the persistent, technologically driven component of
efficiency, already absorbed by the sectoral fixed effects.
We now turn to the role of deep pockets. Column (2) adds the incumbents’ cash holdings:
we find that the latter are negatively correlated with entry of potential competitors. The effect
is statistically significant. To quantify the economic effect, a 10 percent increase in the cash held
by incumbent firms is associated with an average reduction in entry rates of 0.09 percentage
points. Given that the average entry rate is 16 percent, this implies an average drop in entry
rates of about 0.6 percent.
Column (3) of Table 10 separately controls for incumbent own liquidity and (rest of the)
group cash holdings. Business group cash is negatively correlated with entry rates and is
statistically significant. A 10 percent increase in group cash holdings is associated with a
reduction of 0.07 percentage points in entry rates. Thus, according to our estimates, an increase
of 10 percent in group cash entails a reduction of slightly more than 0.4 percent in entry rates.
Note that, due to the presence of industry fixed effects, the estimation of the coefficients only
exploits the within-sector time variation. Thus, the negative coefficient of BG Total Cash is
generated by the fact that in years in which (lagged) group cash is high (low) entry rates go
down (up).
Note also that business group liquidity is significant even though we control for both average
and relative efficiency of incumbents firms. This result is robust to efficiency measures different
from the Olley and Pakes (1996)’s TFP estimates,35 to employment-weighted entry rates (see
Table 23 in Appendix A.2),36 and to the exclusion of all sectoral time-varying controls. This
suggests that the negative correlation we find in the data cannot be completely ascribed to
the higher efficiency of cash-rich incumbent groups discouraging new entry. Our results thus
point to a financial constraint explanation whereby internal capital markets relax the financial
constraints of group-affiliated incumbents, hence increasing their actual and perceived strength.
Efficiency seems to amplify the group deep pocket effect on entry. Column (4) adds the
interaction between BG Total Cash and the (average) efficiency of affiliated incumbents. The
interaction is negative and significant at 10%, suggesting that more efficient units derive larger
strategic benefits from business group affiliation, probably because they are more likely to
receive liquidity injections through the group’s internal capital market. In this sense, our result
is in line with Maksimovic and Phillips’ (2002, 2008) empirical findings that conglomerate firms
channel resources towards their most efficient segments, that as a consequence see their financial
35In unreported regressions (available upon request), we proxy efficiency using either labor productivity or
TFP from the estimate of Cobb-Douglas and Translog production functions. The coefficient of group cash
remains always negative and statistically significant.
36In our data-set employment figures are particularly reliable as they are cross-checked with information
from employer labor tax reports. However, we do not have information on market dedicated employment for
multidivisional firms. For this reason, we use employment-weighted entry rates only as a robustness exercise.
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constraints mitigated.
Finally, comparing column (3) with column (2), we observe that once we control for group
cash, the product market effect of individual firm liquidity is smaller. This again suggests that
access to internal capital markets mitigates the credit rationing problems that make a firm’s
own cash holdings central to product market behavior, and is consistent with the finding in
Hoshi, Kashyap and Scharfstein (1991) that membership in a conglomerate group reduces the
sensitivity of a firm’s investment to its own liquidity.
Table 24, columns (1)-(4), in Appendix A.2 presents the same regressions where we control
also for the age of the industry. We do this to address the concern that cash holdings and entry
rates might move in opposite directions along the life of an industry – cash hoarding is typically
limited in young industries where the scope for entry is wide (see Table 5), whereas in mature
industries with shrinking entry opportunities firms tend to hoard cash. Since French groups
tend to operate in similar industries in terms of maturity, at least within manufacturing (see
Table 8, panel B), this might mechanically lead to group cash being negatively correlated to
entry rates. To the extent that the negative correlation between entry rates and BG Total Cash
is driven by cross-sectoral differences in age, this concern is fully accounted for by the presence
of industry fixed effects. Still, it might be the case that, as a given sector becomes older,
entry rates decrease while incumbents and their affiliated groups accumulate more cash. In our
sample only 20% of age variability is represented by within-sector variability; this means that
sectoral age varies relatively little over-time and makes it unlikely that our results are driven
by the above mechanism. However, to be safe in disregarding this alternative explanation,
we control for the age of the industry in our regressions. As Table 24 shows, results do not
change.37
Finally, as an additional robustness check, we consider different definitions of entrants. So
far we have considered as entrants firms at their first year of activity. In their second year
of activity they are treated as incumbents. However, one might argue that in their second or
third year of activity firms are more similar to new entrants than to established competitors in
the industry. We therefore extend the definition of entrants at time t considering as such not
only new firms appearing at time t but also firms that entered at time t− 1 and at time t− 2.
Accordingly, we re-define the incumbents and we re-compute the incumbent-related variables.
Table 25 (Appendix A.2) shows that the qualitative results do not change.
4.2 Group Deep Pockets and External Capital Markets
In this Section we seek to better understand the economic mechanism underlying our finding
that entry in a given market is negatively correlated with group liquidity hoarded by group units
operating in other markets. For this purpose we explore whether the importance of group cash
for entry is heterogeneous and varies in ways that are consistent with theoretical predictions. If
financial phenomena in business groups are the source of the previous results, we expect group
37As a double check, in Table 24 columns (5)-(8) we control for sectoral trends. Also in this case, results are
unchanged.
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deep pockets to matter more for entry in environments where access to outside financing is
more limited. Also, we expect the role of group cash to be more important in markets where
the need for external funds is larger.
To this aim, we first split sectors in two subgroups according to the severity of financial
market frictions and the degree of external dependence, using a number of proxies described in
detail in the next section. Then, we run separate regressions for each subgroup.
4.2.1 Group Deep Pockets and Access to External Capital Markets
Tangibility
Table 11, columns 1 and 2, investigates whether the effect of group cash on entry is more
important in industries where firms hold less tangible assets. For instance, in the book and
periodical publishing industry, where soft assets make up for 54 percent of asset value, firms
should find it harder to raise external funds as compared to the iron and steel manufacturing
industry, where 96 percent of assets are tangible and can thus be pledged as collateral to raise
capital externally.
In order to classify industries based on asset tangibility, we take the average over time
of market Tangibility, as defined in Section 3.2, and we estimate our equations in the two
sub-samples of markets below and above the median of the distribution of this time-invariant
measure of tangibility. Our results support Prediction 2: the coefficient of BG Total Cash is
larger in industries characterized by low asset tangibility, with the difference between the two
coefficients being statistically significant almost at 5 percent (the p-value is 0.067). Results are
even stronger when we split the sample considering industries belonging to the bottom quartile
and to the top quartile of the distribution: while in very intangible industries the coefficient
of BG Total Cash is -0.016***, in highly tangible industries the impact of group cash is null
(−0.0004). The difference is statistically significant at 1 percent (the p-value is 0.007). Notice
that the inclusion of the industry fixed effects allows us to control for any time-invariant sectoral
characteristics, and thus to identify the coefficient of BG cash out of the within-sector time
variation in each subgroup. Thus, the comparison of the results obtained for the two subgroups
shows that the negative (positive) reaction of entry to periods of high (low) BG cash is stronger
in the subgroup of sectors in which access to credit is more problematic.
Finally, we also find that in the subgroups of sectors where firms hold more tangible assets,
entry seems to be more responsive to the time variation of incumbents’ own liquidity. This
result is consistent with recent ICM theories such as Cestone and Fumagalli (2005): incumbents
with easier access to credit are the ones that receive less liquidity injections from the rest of the
group, hence own financial resources rather than group cash are their main source of financial
muscle.38
38Of course, besides this ICM effect, easier access to credit can be expected to have an additional, conflicting
impact on the role of incumbent deep pockets, to the extent that internally generated liquidity matters less for
entry in a setting where credit is easily available to firms. Although the overall effect is a priori undetermined,
in our data the ICM effect seems to dominate, thus making incumbent own deep pockets more important for
product market entry.
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Sectoral Booms and Busts
Table 11, columns 3 and 4, investigates whether group cash has a differential effect on entry in
markets experiencing an economic downturn as compared to markets undergoing an expansion
period. The former should face more binding financial constraints.
We identify booms and busts from the fluctuations of real sectoral sales, where nominal
sales are deflated by industry-specific price deflators, following the Braun and Larrain (2005)
peak-to-trough criterion. Troughs occur when (the log of) real sales are below their trend by
more than one standard deviation.39 For each trough, we go back in time until we find a local
peak, which is defined as the closest preceding year for which (detrended) real sales are higher
than in the previous and posterior year. A bust goes from the year after the local peak to the
year of the trough. The same procedure is used to identify sectoral booms. A peak occurs
when current real sales are more than one standard deviation above their trend. Once a peak
is identified, we go back in time until we find a local trough, i.e. the closest preceding year
for which (detrended) real sales are lower than in the previous and posterior year. The years
falling between a local trough and a peak are labelled as a boom.
We then run our regressions on the two sub-samples of markets-year observations experi-
encing a bust (column 3) and a boom (column 4). Our results support Prediction 2, as the
coefficient of BG Total Cash is larger when estimated on the subgroup of industries experienc-
ing an economic downturn and thus subject to tighter credit conditions. The difference between
the two coefficients is statistically significant at 5 percent (the p-value is 0.051).
High-Growth and Innovative Industries
Table 12, columns 1 and 2, investigates whether business group cash has a stronger effect on
entry in industries that grow more in the long-run.
We divide our (4 digit SIC) manufacturing industries in two groups: industries where the
growth of the real value of sales during our sample period, 1995-2004, exceeds the median
growth of all manufacturing industries, and industries where the growth of real sales is below
the median. The real value of sales is computed using industry price deflators. Results indicate
that entry is more responsive to the time variation of group cash in fast growing industries
than in industries that grow less in the long-run. However, the difference between the two
coefficients is significant at 10 percent only (the p-value is 0.1).
Results are more clear-cut when we classify industries based on innovation activity, as
measured by patent growth. We have information on all the patents awarded by the European
Patent Office (EPO) to French firms over the period 1995-2003, at the (4 digit) sectoral level.
This allows us to split the sample into the industries where the growth of awarded patents
is above the median and industries where patent growth lies below the median. The waste
management and the medical imaging equipment in which industry patents more than doubled
during our sample period belong to the first group, while the textile industry which displays
very little patenting activity (and also very low sales growth) in most of its 4-SIC codes belongs
39We compute the trend using the Hodrick-Prescott filter with a smoothing parameter of 100.
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to the second.
Columns (3) and (4) of Table 12 show that the coefficient of BG Total Cash is larger in the
subgroup of more innovative industries, with the difference between the two coefficients being
significant at 2 percent (the p-value is 0.022). In line with economic intuition, these results
suggest that when the financing of R&D cannot be supported by hard assets or informational
asymmetries with outside investors are severe, access to group liquidity relaxes financial con-
straints and thus represents a source of competitive strength (in line with Prediction 2).
4.2.2 Financial Dependence and Group Deep Pockets
Table 14, columns 1 and 2, explores whether financially dependent industries display a more
pronounced group deep pocket effect (Prediction 3). In some industries, the amount of internally
generated cash is not in line with the desired capital expenditures. In these environments,
financially dependent incumbents who can draw upon additional sources of funding – such as
group liquidity generated in other sectors – will be perceived as stronger competitors by equally
financially dependent rivals. This in turn may negatively affect entry.
We measure the unobservable technological need for external finance relying on the index
developed by Rajan and Zingales (1998) for U.S. sectors. Their indicator of a firm’s reliance
on external finance is the share of capital expenditures not financed with cash flow from op-
erations. The external financial dependence of U.S. publicly listed companies over the ’80s
(from COMPUSTAT) is computed and then aggregated over time and across companies in a
given industry (by using the industry median). The advantage of classifying industries based
on the amount of external finance used by U.S. listed firms is that capital markets in the U.S.
are among the most advanced in the world, and large publicly traded firms typically face the
least frictions in accessing finance. Hence, the amount of external finance used by listed firms
in the U.S. is likely to be a relatively pure measure of their (technologically driven) demand
for external finance. Conversely, the actual amount of external funds used by (mostly private)
French firms is likely to reflect factors that affect the supply of external finance such as the
availability of hard, collateralizable assets. As long as the technological reasons why some in-
dustries depend more on external finance than others are persistent across countries, the Rajan
and Zingales (1998) financial dependence ranking can be used to identify highly dependent
industries in France.
Table 13 shows the external finance dependence index for the industries ranked by Rajan
and Zingales (1998). The figures have been updated by Braun (2003) and refer to the period
1986-1995. Industries with low external financial dependence include tobacco, leather products,
beverages and petroleum refineries; financially dependent industries include electrical machinery
and professional and scientific equipment. As shown in the Table, to classify industries in our
sample according to the Rajan and Zingales (1998) index we match the U.S. ISIC classification
code with the French Activity Classification (NAF Code). This allows us to identify sectors
whose external financial dependence is above/below the median of the distribution and to
estimate our equations in the two sub-samples.
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Results in Table 14 support Prediction 3: entry reacts to the time variation of business
group cash in financially dependent industries, while it shows no reaction to group cash in less
dependent industries. The difference between the two coefficients is significant at 10 percent.
This shows that group cash disproportionately affects entry in financially dependent sectors,
consistently with previous work by Klapper, Laeven and Rajan (2006) and Aghion, Fally and
Scarpetta (2007) who show that financial development matters more for entry in more finan-
cially dependent industries.
4.3 Group-Backed Entry versus Stand-Alone Entry
In the previous sections we have explored the hypothesis that ICM activity in cash-rich groups,
by mitigating financial constraints of affiliated incumbents, makes them stronger product mar-
ket competitors, thereby discouraging entry of new firms. We now investigate the complemen-
tary hypothesis that firms backed by cash-rich groups are better equipped at entering new
markets. Indeed, the descriptive statistics presented in Section 3.3 hint at this possibility: af-
filiated entrants tend to be larger and more efficient than stand-alone entrants. Furthermore,
in markets dominated by cash-rich incumbent groups, a larger percentage of entrants is in turn
group-affiliated.
We estimate the following system of three equations, where we distinguish the entry rates
of stand-alone firms from the entry rates of group-affiliated firms:
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Entrysai,t measures the percentage of industry i’s sales in year t accounted for by stand-alone
entrants, while Entrybgi,t is the percentage of industry sales accounted for by group-affiliated
entrants. Entryi,t is the total entry rate, which is obviously equal to the sum of Entry
sa
i,t and
Entrybgi,t. The equations of the system contain the same variables as our baseline equation (1),
including the industry fixed effects and a full set of year dummies. In the group-backed entry
equation and in the total entry equation we also add the cash held by the groups affiliated with
new entrants (TCBGEi,t−1 ) and the ratio of the efficiency of incumbent groups to the efficiency of
entrant groups (Reffi,t−1). The three equations are jointly estimated in a seemingly unrelated
regression (SUR) system to account for possible cross-equation error correlation. Notice that,
given that the set of controls varies across equations, the estimated coefficients are different
from the ones that would be obtained estimating the equations separately.
Let us first focus on group-backed entry (Table 15, columns 1 and 4). Similarly to our
results on overall entry, we find that – controlling for incumbent firms’ efficiency – group-
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backed entry is reduced when incumbent firms/groups hoard more cash. Furthermore, in line
with Prediction 4, the coefficient of Entrant BG Total Cash is positive and significant: entry
of groups in a market is facilitated when the former have piled large cash reserves in their
originating markets. In column (4) we also interact incumbent group cash with entrant group
cash: the interaction term is positive and significant, indicating that cash rich groups willing
to enter a market are less likely to be deterred by the incumbent groups’ deep pockets. While
this suggests that relative financial muscle is a factor affecting group entry, groups planning
entry into new markets also compare their level of efficiency to that of incumbent groups. To
address this question, in columns 1 and 4 we also control for the ratio of the efficiency of
established groups to the efficiency of the entrant groups (Inc. BG Eff./Entr. BG Eff.).40 The
estimated coefficient is significantly negative (and stable across specifications), suggesting that
relative efficiency and financial strength considerations both play a role in business groups’
entry decisions.41
The results in columns 2 and 5 refer instead to stand-alone entry. Stand alone entrants,
whose scale of entry is on average much smaller with respect to group entrants,42 do react
negatively to group deep pockets, though to a lesser extent. Indeed, a one percent increase in
incumbent group cash implies a 2.2 percent reduction in the stand-alone entry rate, as opposed
to a 5.1 percent reduction in the group-backed entry rate.43 The significantly smaller size
of stand-alone firms as opposed to group-affiliated firms may suggest that in some industries
stand-alone entrants try to exploit local market niches where they may be less affected by
the strategic moves of big, group-affiliated players. This would explain a pattern common
to various 4-digit sectors, where several small entrants, mostly stand-alone firms, challenge
few large group-affiliated incumbents (e.g. bakery products, or wine in the food industry).
However, as reported further on in Table 20, stand-alone entrants represent a good 3/4 of the
entrants that exit the market within 5 years after entry. This would rather suggest that small
entrepreneurial entrants have limited experience to gauge their post-entry productivity and
their ability to withstand their rivals’ financial muscle.44 The next section, where we study the
40Table 8 suggests that in choosing their portfolio of manufacturing activities, groups tend to focus on closely
related sectors, possibly in order to exploit common skills. Hence, our measure of relative efficiency compares
the average efficiency of incumbent groups across the various manufacturing sectors where they operate to the
average efficiency of entrant groups across the manufacturing sectors where they are already established.
41Results are qualitatively the same if we construct our measure of group efficiency considering only units
that belong to the same 3-digit (as well as 2-digit) sector as the entrant.
42See Tables 6 and 7. If one considers unweighted figures, the small size of stand-alone entrants appears even
more clearly. The median value of employment is 7 for stand-alone entrants, while it is 53 for affiliated entrants
(the mean values are, respectively, 17 and 367). The median value of assets is 134 (in thousands of Euros) for
stand-alone entrants and 2737 for affiliated entrants (the mean values being respectively 949 and 72436).
43Recall that the coefficient of (Inc.) BG Total Cash is a semi-elasticity, as we take the log of Total Cash while
entry rates are simple shares. To compute elasticities, we refer to the average entry rates indicated in Table 1.
Note that the entry rate by stand-alone firms amounts to 4.4%, thereby only accounting for 1/3 of the overall
entry rate. Then, a 1% increase in (Inc.) BG Total Cash, by decreasing the stand-alone entry rate by 0.001
percentage points, produces a reduction of the stand-alone entry rate equal to (0.001/0.044)=2.2%. Similarly,
the entry rate by affiliated firms amounts to 11.6%, hence a 1% increase in (Inc.) BG Total Cash, by decreasing
the group-backed entry rate by 0.007 percentage points, produces a reduction of (0.007/0.116)=5.1%.
44The observed pattern of entry followed by immediate exit can be, for instance, reproduced by dynamic
industry models a` la Hopenhayn (1992), in which firms take entry decisions before observing the realization of
their (ex-ante random) productivity level.
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survival of stand-alone versus group entrants in the 3 to 5 year window post-entry, will provide
more support to this idea.
The descriptive statistics presented in Section 3.3 show that groups entering into very young
industries tend to hold most of their liquid reserves in units active in older sectors. This
raises the question of whether groups use the cash hoarded in their older existing businesses
to subsidize entry into new industries. We address this issue in the following way. We define
a dummy variable which takes value one when the age of the industry where entry takes
place is below the median (Young Sector) and a variable which measures the average age of the
industries where the entrant group is already established (Entrant Group Age). We then add to
the BG-entry equation a triple interaction among Entrant Group Total Cash, Young Sector and
Entrant Group Age. As Table 16, column (1) shows, the coefficient of the interaction is positive
and statistically significant; this indicates that entry into young industries is more facilitated
by an entrant group’s cash when the entering group is established in older sectors. This is in
line with previous findings (see Maksimovic and Phillips 2008) that conglomerate segments in
growth industries are more likely to expand within their industries if the conglomerate also has
less productive divisions in a declining industry.
Group-Backed Entry in Financially Constrained and Financially Dependent Sectors
As argued in section 2, the financial flexibility guaranteed by cash-holdings is likely to have
a more pronounced strategic role when access to external finance is costly. One would then
expect that cash-rich established groups are better able to finance their way into high-growth
innovative industries, industries with little tangible assets, as well as industries experiencing a
downturn.
Table 17 displays estimates of our system of equations in the two sub-samples of high-
growth and low-growth industries as defined in subsection 4.2.1. In line with Prediction 4, in
the group-backed entry equation we find that the coefficient of Entrant BG Total Cash is larger
in high-growth industries (column 4) than in low-growth industries (column 1). The coefficients
are significantly different from each other at the 8% level. We also find that group-backed and
stand-alone entry reacts to the time variation of incumbent group cash in high-growth industries
(columns 4 and 5), but not in low-growth markets (columns 1 and 2). Interestingly, the relative
efficiency of entrant groups with respect to established groups is a determinant of group-backed
entry only in high-growth industries. When we classify industries based on innovation activity
(columns 10, 7, 11 and 8), results are qualitatively similar.
We also obtain similar results when we split our sample into booming industries and indus-
tries experiencing a recession, and low- versus high-tangibility industries (Table 18). (Group-
backed and stand-alone) entry is sensitive to the time variation of incumbent group cash only
in low-tangibility sectors (columns 7 and 8 vs. 10 and 11). Group backed entry is facilitated by
entrant group cash in both low-tangibility and high-tangibility sectors, but in low-tangibility
sectors the effect of group cash is stronger (columns 7 and 10); the difference between coeffi-
cients of Entrant BG Total Cash is significant at 10%. A very similar pattern emerges from
columns 1 and 2 versus 4 and 5, where we compare the impact of incumbent group cash and
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entrant group cash in sectors experiencing a bust as opposed to sectors experiencing a boom.
Finally, we classify industries according to their level of external financial dependence (Low
FD versus High FD) and estimate our system in the two sub-samples. Table 19 shows the re-
sults: as expected, group-backed entry shows a larger reaction to changes in entrant group cash
in financially dependent industries, such as professional scientific equipment, than in the sub-
group of industries in which external financial dependence is low, such as tobacco or beverages.
In line with previous results, we find that only in financially dependent industries incumbent
groups’ cash has a negative impact on (group and stand-alone) entry.
4.4 Exit of Recent Entrants
We have investigated whether group cash affects the entry decision of new firms and the scale
at which they decide to start their activity. We now explore the role of group cash for the
survival/exit of recent entrants.
Recent entrants seem particularly vulnerable to exit. In our sample we observe that, on
average, 68% of a cohort of new entrants abandons the industry in the 5 years after entry (see
Table 20, Panel A). Dunne et al. (1988) find very similar figures for the US: on average, across
the four-digit U.S. manufacturing industries, 61.5% of firms exit in the five years following the
first census in which they are observed. Futhermore, Table 20 shows that stand-alone recent
entrants are more likely to leave the market: indeed, almost 3/4 of the exiters are stand-alone
firms.
If access to group liquidity is a source of competitive strength, then entrants should be
less likely to survive when established rivals are affiliated with cash-rich groups. Conversely,
entrants that are backed by cash-rich groups should be less vulnerable to exit. We test this
hypothesis by estimating the following system of equations:
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We focus on exit of recent entrants in the 3 to 5 year window after entry. In particular, we
measure exit of firms that entered in market i at time t (Exiti,t) as the percentage of entrants’
sales that is accounted for by entrants that exit from market i in the 3 to 5 years post entry. In
the equations above we distinguish between the exit rate of stand-alone entrants and the exit
rate of group-affiliated entrants. As for entry (see Equation (2)), also in this case we control for
the characteristics of the market, of the incumbents and of the incumbent and entrant groups,
including efficiency.
Table 20, Panel B provides some descriptive statistics on the exit rates. The first two rows of
Panel B refer to unweighted exit rates, i.e. to the number of entrants that abandon the industry
in the 3 to 5 year window after entry as a percentage of the total number of entrants in market
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i at time t. The last two rows refer to weighted exit rates. We find that, on average, 13% of
entrants in market i at time t leave the industry in the 3 to 5 years after entry. Group-backed
entrants are less likely to exit, as they represent less than 1/3 of the entrants that decide to leave
the market. However, affiliated exiters account for a larger proportion of the entrants’ total
sales as compared to stand-alone exiters, namely almost 2/3 of the recent entrants’ total sales.
This is due to the fact that affiliated entrants are larger than stand-alone entrants (see Table 6).
Our equations relate the exit of recent entrants to the (own or group) cash held by entrants
and incumbents when entry is planned, controlling for the market characteristics at the time
of entry, which allows us to control for entrants selection. Indeed, market characteristics and
cash holdings when exit occurs (i.e., at t+3 to t+5), and exit decisions are likely to be jointly
determined. Moreover, entrant (incumbent) group cash at the time of entry is not affected by
any cash injections towards the entrant (the incumbent) that may occur after entry has taken
place; this allows us to study the role of group deep pockets intended as potential resources
available for distribution.
Table 21 shows the results. Firms that enter markets where incumbents are affiliated with
cash rich groups tend to exit more in the 3 to 5 year window after entry. Thus, incumbent
group deep pockets represent a threat even to those firms that are strong enough to enter
industries dominated by cash-rich groups. The exit rate of stand-alone entrants in the 3 to
5 year window post-entry is particularly affected by the presence of deep-pocketed groups in
the market. Indeed, a 1 percent increase in incumbent groups’ cash increases the 3-to-5 year
exit rate of stand-alone entrants by 7.8%, as opposed to a 5.8% increase in the exit rate of
group-backed entrants. This confirms that incumbent groups’ deep pockets pose an important
challenge to small entrepreneurial firms. Finally, we find that entrants that are affiliated with
cash-richer groups when entry is planned tend to exit less, possibly because they enter the
market better equipped to survive.
4.5 Additional Evidence
Group Cash Holdings and Internal Capital Market Activity
If access to cash-rich groups’ internal capital markets boosts firms’ competitive strength by
relaxing financial constraints, then we would expect the correlation between group liquidity
and entry to be more pronounced when internal capital markets are more active. As a proxy
for the intensity of Internal Capital Market activity, we use the number of within-group financial
intermediaries. Indeed, financial intermediaries within a group are likely to facilitate the flow
of resources across different subsidiaries, thus making a group’s internal capital market more
active. This view is supported by Hoshi, Kashyap, and Scharfstein (1991) and more recently
by Samphantharak (2006), who finds that affiliation with financial intermediaries reduces the
investment-cash flow sensitivity of group member firms. Hence, we classify our industries
based on the number of financial intermediaries incumbents are affiliated with through a group
structure. We expect group cash to exert a stronger effect on entry in sectors where incumbents
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are affiliated with a number of financial intermediaries above the median.
Table 14, columns 3 and 4, shows the results. The coefficient of BG cash is negative and
significantly different from zero only in industries dominated by groups including at least one
financial intermediary. However, the difference between the coefficients of BG cash in the two
sub-samples is not significantly different from zero (the p-value is 0.2).
Shocks to Group Cash
While theory suggests that product market competition is affected by the overall depth of group
pockets (which include both the stock of net liquid assets held at a given time and current cash
flows), it might be argued that changes in net liquid assets reflect a group’s liquidity policy,
that in turn may incorporate strategic considerations of entry deterrence. For this reason, we
also study how entry in a market reacts to changes in group cash flows which are arguably
less subject to manipulation. In doing this, we allow negative and positive shocks to affect
asymmetrically an incumbent’s competitive strength (and thus entry in its market). Table 22
reports results from the estimation of equation (1), where group liquidity is now replaced by
two dummies (Shock−i,t and Shock
+
i,t) capturing non-negligible year-to-year changes in group
liquidity. Shock−i,t indicates a negative shock to group liquidity in year t (for groups affiliated
to incumbents in market i), and takes a value one if there is a fall in group cash flows of more
than 10% in year t relative to the previous year and zero otherwise. Shock+i,t is analogous to
Shock−i,t and takes a value one if there is an increase in group cash flows of more than 10% in
year t relative to the previous year and zero otherwise.45
Column 1 indicates that when incumbent-affiliated groups experience a year-to-year fall
in cash flows larger than 10%, market entry increases by 2.3 percentage points. By contrast,
market entry does not seem to respond to positive shocks to group liquidity (see column 2).
Interestingly, this asymmetric result carries over to unreported estimates, where we use alter-
native measures of shocks to group cash. A potential explanation for the strong pro-entry effect
of negative shocks to group cash is that groups that are hit by a substantial reduction in cash
flows may switch from a regime where they provide liquidity to affiliated firms even when these
are faced with more intense competition, to a regime where they exit markets challenged by
new entrants. As a consequence, a “Matsusaka and Nanda effect” may invite entry in those
groups’ markets. This change of regime would not occur for long-pursed groups experiencing a
positive shock to their cash flows, which can explain why entry reacts mildly to such shocks.
Group loans actually received
In Section 4.2 we have explored the hypothesis that incumbents “backed” by cash-rich groups
are perceived as stronger competitors by potential entrants as they are expected to face less
stringent financial constraints. To this purpose, in our estimated equations we have controlled
45The year-to-year change represents a rough yet immediate measure of shocks to cash flows (see Bertrand
and Mullainathan 2001 and Gopalan, Nanda and Seru 2007 for similar shock measures). Results are robust
to different values of the threshold (5% and 20%). In additional unreported estimates available upon request,
we focus on changes in cash flows held by units operating in distant markets, i.e. in markets outside the
incumbent’s 2SIC market. We also experiment with an alternative measure of shocks to group liquidity defined
as the residual of a regression of group cash flows on sector and year effects. Results are similar in both cases.
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for the cash holdings of incumbent-affiliated groups – a measure of the resources available for
redistribution in favor of the incumbents. Alternatively, potential rivals may give up enter-
ing a market because, at the time the entry decision is made, they observe that incumbents
have actually received resources from the rest of the group.46 We proxy such cash injection
with the loans received by incumbents from the rest of the group (Inc Loans from BG) and
we introduce this as an additional control in our entry equation. Column (3) in Table 22
shows that the magnitude and the precision of the coefficient of group cash is unaffected by
the inclusion of intra-group loans received by incumbents: entrants are put off by incumbents’
easy access to a source of internal finance (the group’s cash reserves). Conversely, group loans
do not have a significant impact on entry into product markets. Hence, we find no evidence
that entry is being deterred by actual (strategic) liquidity injections in favor of incumbent firms.
5 Conclusion
This paper finds that entry rates in French manufacturing sectors are inversely related to the
amount of liquidity hoarded by incumbent-affiliated groups, and positively related to entrant
groups’ cash. This is in line with the theoretical prediction (Cestone and Fumagalli, 2005) that
cash-rich groups can be expected to shift liquidity in favor of units facing higher costs of external
finance, hence providing the latter with a competitive edge over their rivals. Theory also
suggests that entry should be more sensitive to (incumbent and entrant) group cash holdings
in industries characterized by more severe financial constraints and by larger external financial
needs. We find evidence consistent with these predictions.
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first work to investigate the link between product
market dynamics and the (financial) characteristics of business groups. Our analysis is made
possible by a unique dataset providing extensive information on the balance sheets as well as
the ownership status of individual French firms.
A policy implication that can be drawn from our analysis is that, in environments where
external finance is costly to raise, the presence in a market of incumbents affiliated with cash-
rich groups should be seriously considered as a barrier to entry. In other words, an accurate
assessment of competitive conditions in a given market requires to shift attention from the
potential threat posed by incumbents’ deep pockets to the threat posed by the deep pockets of
incumbent-affiliated groups.
However, our findings do not support the view that group-membership is per se anti-
competitive. First, to the extent that established groups rely on their deep pockets to sub-
sidize large-scale entry into young, high growth industries, cash rich groups may as well exert
a pro-competitive effect. Secondly, we do not provide evidence that internal capital market
46From a theoretical standpoint, both actual and expected cash injections – provided they are ex post optimal
from the group perspective – have the potential to help market incumbents discourage entry. Of course, in a
well-functioning internal capital market, cash injections that are not ex post optimal for the group suffer from
a commitment problem and are thus unlikely to have any strategic effect.
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activity facilitates predatory behavior by channelling resources from cash-rich subsidiaries en-
joying a dominant position in one market towards units facing more intense competition.47,48
In fact, our paper suggests that the financial slack provided to group members allows them to
adopt product market strategies not available to (financially constrained) stand-alone rivals.
This may well make the competitive environment tougher and, despite lower entry, benefit
consumers (and total welfare) through lower prices, superior quality and the selection of more
efficient product market players.49 It is only in specific situations that access to group liquid
wealth may facilitate predation. Whether the case at hand exhibits the factual characteristics
that make predation a likely outcome should be assessed with care.
To conclude, in the present paper we have focused on the effect of internal capital markets
on product market entry. Our results shed light on the claim that access to group liquidity, by
alleviating financial constraints, may affect a firm’s behavior along several dimensions, among
which its employment policy, its propensity to engage in international trade and the intensity
of its R&D activity. These are three issues we plan to investigate next.
47This is a long-standing concern in the anti-trust arena, that recently has been revived in Europe by the
formation of large privatized multi-utilities and by the European Commission’s recent stance that conglomerate
mergers may create scope for anti-competitive spillovers. A prominent example is the EC’s ban on the proposal to
merge General Electric and Honeywell (Case No. COMP/M.2220): in motivating its decision, the Commission
maintained that a merger with GE would allow Honeywell to rely on GE’s deep pockets to fund predatory
practices in its own markets. (This decision was upheld by the Court of First Instance, but the motivations
for the predatory behavior have been considered insufficient.) Additionally, in the 2009 Guidance Paper on the
enforcement of Article 82, the EC has expressed concerns about dominant firms subsidizing their non-dominant
affiliates’ exclusionary practices (Section C.62, page 20).
48In this respect, our paper does not provide a test to the argument that financially fit incumbents can engage
in predatory practices in order to financially exhaust their rivals and drive them out of their markets (See Telser,
1966, Benoit, 1984, and Bolton and Scharfstein, 1990).
49Descriptive statistics in Table 7 are consistent with this argument.
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Table 1: Entry Patterns Into Product Markets
Quartiles
Mean St.Dev. p25 p50 p75 N
# of Entrants All 46.6 78.7 7 19 56 3083
> 1% Sales 2.32 2.15 1 2 3 3083
> 5% Sales .53 .87 0 0 1 3083
# of Firms All 249 437 35 99 301 3083
> 1% Sales 15.6 6.91 10 16 21 3083
Entry Rate (%) 16 17 5.6 11.5 19.9 3083
Entry Rate by BG (%) 11.6 17 1.8 5.5 13.2 3083
Entry Rate in Booms (%) 19.6 16.5 8.9 15.1 25.8 614
Entry Rate in Busts (%) 13.3 12.3 5.24 10.7 17.3 754
Note: Sectoral-level data between 1995 and 2004. We define as Entrants in market i at time t all firms that
appear at time t and were not active at time t− 1. Entry Rates in sector i year t is the ratio of sales of entrant
firms over total sales in sector i year t. Sectoral booms and busts are identified from the fluctuations of real
sectoral sales (where nominal sales are deflated by industry price deflators) using a peak-to-trough criterion.
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Table 2: Entry rates in 4-digit sectors experiencing booms and busts
PANEL A: BOOMS
2-digit Name Average entry rate in 4-digit sectors in boom
code 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 Over time
15 Food 0.202 0.232 0.181 0.163 0.151 0.377 0.176 0.321 0.236
17 Textile 0.158 0.116 0.075 0.089 0.194 0.247 0.135
18 Apparel 0.341 0.203 0.120 0.200 0.171 0.184 0.332 0.194
19 Leather and leather products 0.081 0.077 0.073 0.111 0.063 0.125 0.091
20 Wood and lumber 0.141 0.085 0.095 0.064 0.371 0.136
21 Paper and allied products 0.096 0.112 0.058 0.064 0.309 0.240 0.112
22 Printing and publishing 0.157 0.327 0.162 0.171 0.168 0.296 0.048 0.208
24 Chemicals and allied products 0.199 0.175 0.114 0.093 0.216 0.472 0.147 0.224 0.202
25 Rubber and plastics 0.174 0.151 0.138 0.435 0.165 0.184
26 Stone, clay, glass 0.150 0.208 0.199 0.241 0.172 0.186 0.197
(and other nonmetallic mineral products)
27 Primary metal industries 0.062 0.134 0.269 0.174 0.293 0.754 0.248
28 Fabricated metal products 0.177 0.127 0.133 0.182 0.026 0.204 0.079 0.152
29 Machinery and equipment 0.132 0.250 0.207 0.156 0.148 0.217 0.176 0.230 0.194
(industrial and household)
30 Computer and office equipment 0.354 0.288 0.321
31 Electrical equipments and supplies 0.052 0.133 0.124 0.117 0.337 0.530 0.166
32 Radio, TV and communications equipments 0.211 0.187 0.195 0.106 0.165
33 Instruments and related products 0.130 0.054 0.153 0.348 0.115 0.211
34 Motor vehicles 0.133 0.126 0.225 0.224 0.177
35 Other transportation equipment 0.110 0.128 0.079 0.059 0.039 0.369 0.115
36 Furniture and miscellaneous industries 0.187 0.142 0.108 0.145 0.161 0.142 0.144
(e.g. jewelry, musical instruments,
toys and sporting goods)
37 Recycling 0.168 0.140 0.154
PANEL B: BUSTS
2-digit Name Average entry rate in 4-digit sectors in bust
code 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 Over time
15 Food 0.108 0.072 0.110 0.107 0.118 0.195 0.124 0.137 0.115
17 Textile 0.266 0.062 0.114 0.041 0.098 0.205 0.107 0.157 0.132
18 Apparel 0.168 0.163 0.115 0.108 0.137 0.176 0.075 0.138
19 Leather and leather products 0.066 0.086 0.123 0.100 0.088 0.125 0.087 0.082 0.092
20 Wood and lumber 0.101 0.137 0.119 0.146 0.108 0.063 0.100 0.108
21 Paper and allied products 0.054 0.022 0.035 0.196 0.166 0.054 0.074 0.113
22 Printing and publishing 0.211 0.022 0.086 0.158 0.168 0.303 0.116 0.103 0.157
24 Chemicals and allied products 0.260 0.057 0.087 0.156 0.017 0.122
25 Rubber and plastics 0.131 0.003 0.124 0.181 0.100 0.075 0.124
26 Stone, clay, glass 0.236 0.058 0.054 0.102 0.065 0.009 0.089
(and other nonmetallic mineral products)
27 Primary metal industries 0.030 0.060 0.054 0.162 0.102 0.001 0.107
28 Fabricated metal products 0.191 0.141 0.144 0.048 0.112 0.000 0.046 0.081 0.082
29 Machinery and equipment 0.170 0.132 0.070 0.111 0.133 0.048 0.078 0.089 0.117
(industrial and household)
30 Computer and office equipment 0.023 0.275 0.054 0.118
31 Electric equipments and supplies 0.205 0.012 0.451 0.119 0.256 0.233
32 Radio, TV and communications equipments 0.058 0.230 0.276 0.081 0.205
33 Instruments and related products 0.055 0.199 0.199 0.103 0.172
34 Motor vehicles 0.014 0.049 0.081 0.143 0.148 0.126 0.086
35 Other transportation equipment 0.082 0.121 0.162 0.268 0.176 0.089 0.030 0.155
36 Furniture and miscellaneous industries 0.110 0.100 0.075 0.068 0.143 0.087 0.087 0.087 0.096
(e.g. jewelry, musical instruments,
toys and sporting goods)
37 Recycling 0.127 0.149 0.169 0.148
Note: Sectoral booms and busts are identified from the fluctuations of real sectoral sales (where nominal sales are
deflated by industry price deflators) using a peak-to-trough criterion. For each year, indicated at the head of the
columns, Panel A (Panel B) displays the average entry rate in the four-digit sectors in boom (in bust) that year
and that belong to the two-digit aggregation indicated at the beginning of the raw. The last column displays
the average over the sample period of the entry rate in all of the four-digit sectors in boom (in bust) that belong
to the two-digit aggregation indicated at the beginning of the raw. The regression sample starts from 1997
because the right-hand side variables in our entry equation are one-period lagged. Further, we estimate firms’
TFP using the Olley and Pakes (1996) methodology, which requires information on lagged values of inputs.
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Table 3: 4-digit sectors experiencing booms and busts
PANEL A: BOOMS
2-digit Name Number of 4-digit sectors in boom Total Number of different Number of years
code 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 4-digit sectors in boom a 4-digit sector is in boom
15 Food (46) 6 7 11 6 1 8 2 4 45 26 1.7
17 Textile (24) 9 12 10 5 5 5 0 0 46 19 2.4
18 Apparel (8) 1 4 4 2 1 1 0 1 14 7 2
19 Leather and leather products (3) 1 1 1 2 1 1 0 0 7 2 3.5
20 Wood and lumber (7) 3 4 5 1 0 2 0 0 15 7 2.1
21 Paper and allied products (9) 1 3 4 2 1 1 0 0 12 5 2.4
22 Printing and publishing (13) 3 5 5 4 2 2 1 0 22 8 2.7
24 Chemicals and allied products (22) 5 5 5 2 1 3 1 2 24 9 2.6
25 Rubber and plastics (9) 3 5 6 2 0 2 0 0 18 7 2.5
26 Stone, clay, glass (28) 6 8 5 5 1 1 0 0 26 12 2.2
(and other nonmetallic mineral products)
27 Primary metal industries (20) 3 7 4 5 3 3 0 0 25 12 2
28 Fabricated metal products (29) 13 14 13 13 1 2 0 1 57 21 2.7
29 Machinery and equipment (42) 7 16 15 13 6 3 1 2 63 27 2.3
(industrial and household)
30 Computer and office equipment (2) 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 2 1 2
31 Electrical equipments and supplies (13) 3 3 4 2 0 2 0 1 15 6 2.5
32 Radio, TV and communications equipments (7) 3 3 3 5 0 0 0 0 14 5 2.8
33 Instruments and related products (8) 1 0 1 2 0 4 2 0 10 6 1.6
34 Motor vehicles (4) 1 2 2 1 0 0 0 0 6 2 3
35 Other transportation equipment (12) 1 1 2 2 1 1 0 0 8 3 2.6
36 Furniture and miscellaneous industries (16) 5 9 8 9 5 2 0 0 38 12 3.2
(e.g. jewelry, musical instruments,
toys and sporting goods)
37 Recycling (2) 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 2 2 1
Total 76 109 108 85 29 43 7 12 469 199 2.4
PANEL B: BUSTS
2-digit Name Number of 4-digit sectors in bust Total Number of different Number of years
code 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 4-digit sectors in bust a 4-digit sector is in bust
15 Food (46) 1 1 10 21 34 1 6 2 76 39 1.9
17 Textile (24) 4 3 5 5 7 7 8 5 44 21 2.1
18 Apparel (8) 4 2 1 2 6 3 3 0 21 8 2.6
19 Leather and leather products (3) 1 1 1 1 2 1 2 2 11 3 3.6
20 Wood and lumber (7) 1 1 0 4 5 2 5 4 22 7 3.1
21 Paper and allied products (9) 1 2 2 4 3 1 0 1 14 7 2
22 Printing and publishing (13) 4 2 2 3 5 3 3 3 25 12 2.1
24 Chemicals and allied products (22) 0 1 2 10 16 0 0 2 31 18 1.7
25 Rubber and plastics (9) 1 0 1 4 5 0 1 3 15 7 2.1
26 Stone, clay, glass (28) 3 0 2 9 15 0 1 3 33 21 1.6
(and other nonmetallic mineral products)
27 Primary metal industries (20) 0 1 2 5 10 2 1 0 21 13 1.6
28 Fabricated metal products (29) 1 1 1 5 11 3 4 6 32 19 1.7
29 Machinery and equipment (42) 10 2 2 3 12 6 4 2 41 23 1.8
(industrial and household)
30 Computer and office equipment (2) 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 3 2 1.5
31 Electric equipments and supplies (13) 1 1 3 6 12 0 0 0 23 12 1.9
32 Radio, TV and communications equipments (7) 0 0 0 1 5 2 1 0 9 5 1.8
33 Instruments and related products (8) 0 0 2 3 8 1 0 0 14 8 1.7
34 Motor vehicles (4) 0 1 0 2 2 1 1 1 8 4 2
35 Other transportation equipment (12) 2 2 1 3 3 1 1 0 13 9 1.4
36 Furniture and miscellaneous industries (16) 5 2 4 5 5 2 4 4 31 13 2.4
(e.g. jewelry, musical instruments,
toys and sporting goods)
37 Recycling (2) 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 3 2 1.5
Total 39 24 42 97 168 36 46 38 490 253 1.9
PANEL C
Total number of 4-digit sectors 214 196 179 147 132 250 276 279
neither in boom nor in bust
Note: Sectoral booms and busts are identified from the fluctuations of real sectoral sales (where nominal sales
are deflated by industry price deflators) using a peak-to-trough criterion. For each year, indicated at the head
of the columns, Panel A (Panel B) displays the number of four-digit sectors in boom (in bust) that year and
that belong to the two-digit aggregation indicated at the beginning of the raw. The second column reports in
parenthesis the total number of four-digit sectors that belong to that two-digit aggregation indicated at the
beginning of the raw. The regression sample starts from 1997 because the right-hand side variables in our entry
equation are one-period lagged. Further, we estimate firms’ TFP using the Olley and Pakes (1996) methodology,
which requires information on lagged values of inputs.
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Table 4: Top/Bottom Entry Sectors
TOP 10 ENTRY SECTORS
4 digit Code Name Rank Entry rate Number of % of affiliated Affiliated entrants’
entrants entrants share of entry rate
351B Ships for civil purposes 1 0.389 (0.34) 16.2 (3.27) 0.32 0.77
331A Medical imaging equipment 2 0.346 (0.349) 16.6 (5.15) 0.20 0.63
158B Bakery products 3 0.323 (0.10) 95.3 (28.5) 0.07 0.30
283B Reactors and related 4 0.322 (0.25) 12 (6.7) 0.46 0.75
material for the nuclear industry
159G Wines 5 0.291 (0.11) 59 (17.8) 0.20 0.30
262J Other ceramic products not elsewhere classified 6 0.269 (0.17) 3.7 (1.73) 0.35 0.36
262E Ceramic insulators and insulating fittings 7 0.263 (0.30) 2.3 (1.87) 0.50 0.59
264C Construction products in baked clay 8 0.258 (0.218) 3.4 (2.7) 0.31 0.50
(excluding bricks and tiles)
223E Reproduction of computer media 9 0.257 (0.26) 7.56 (3.32) 0.09 0.39
351A Building, repair and maintenance of of warships 10 0.256 (0.35) 3 (2.06) 0.55 0.81
BOTTOM 10 ENTRY SECTORS
265E Plaster 302 0.045 (0.075) 1.55 (0.88) 0.29 0.41
274G Primary processing of lead, zinc and tin 303 0.044 (0.038) 3.33 (2.06) 0.39 0.43
159B Distilled alcoholic beverages 304 0.044 (0.031) 12.9 (3.85) 0.28 0.55
265A Cement 305 0.037 (0.053) 2.9 (1.45) 0.34 0.61
261E Flat glass 306 0.036 (0.029) 16.9 (5.25) 0.18 0.53
265C Lime 307 0.035 (0.036) 2.55 (1.4) 0.58 0.60
261K Glass insulators 308 0.031 (0.05) 1.2 (1.3) 0.50 0.61
153A Milled, dehydrated and frozen potato products 309 0.029 (0.04) 3.1 (2.5) 0.35 0.53
287J Chains 310 0.028 (0.06) 0.44 (0.72) 0.66 0.67
272A Cast iron tubes 311 0.010 (0.02) 1 (0.86) 0.08 0.05
Note: The table displays the ten sectors with the highest (lowest) entry rates over the sample period. We define as Entrant in market i at time t all firms that appear
at time t and were not active at time t− 1. Entry Rates in sector i year t is the ratio of sales of entrant firms over total sales in sector i year t. For each sector we report
the average over time of the variables indicated at the head of the columns. Standard deviations are reported in parenthesis.
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Table 5: Characteristics of Top 10/Bottom 10 Entry Sectors
Entry rate Number of Number of % of affiliated Affiliated entrants’ Number of Number of % of affiliated
entrants entrants > 1% entrants share of entry rate incumbents incumbents > 1% incumbents
Top 10 0.298 (0.247) 21.90 (7.32) 3.133 0.308 0.540 52.80 9.61 0.307
Bottom 10 0.034 (0.045) 4.59 (2.03) 0.722 0.367 0.499 23.94 8.26 0.507
Top decile 0.251 (0.213) 24.67 (8.02) 2.76 0.348 0.645 69 9.63 0.366
Bottom decile 0.056 (0.061) 12.86 (4.48) 1.02 0.343 0.53 72.89 11.4 0.475
Affiliated incumbents’ Age Growth of Capital HHI Financial Incumbent BG cash Entrant BG Cash
market share patents Intensity Dependence
Top 10 0.50 15.6 0.840 0.672 0.284 0.179 2542375 1854603
Bottom 10 0.81 23.6 0.283 1.410 0.432 0.147 1836353 937535
Top decile 0.569 16.4 1.209 0.683 0.246 0.279 2561101 1721116
Bottom decile 0.786 21.7 0.329 1.029 0.304 0.193 2145231 1467390
Note: The top panel of the table displays the average value over the sample period for the top ten and bottom ten sectors of the variables indicated at the head of the
columns. We define as Entrants in market i at time t all firms that appear at time t and were not active at time t− 1. Entry Rates in sector i year t is the ratio of sales
of entrant firms over total sales in sector i year t. We define as incumbents in market i at time t all the firms that are active at time t and were active at time t− 1. Age
of industry i in year t is measured as the average age of the firms that operate in that industry. Patent Growth in market i at time t measures the average growth of
patents awarded by the European Patent Office to the firms active in that market over the period 1995-2003. Capital Intensity in industry i in year t is measured as the
ratio of fixed assets over output. HHI in market i at time t is the value of the Herfindahl index. Financial dependence is the share of capital expenditures not financed
with cash flow from operations. This is computed for US publicly listed companies in the period 1986-1995 and then aggregated over time and across companies in a
given industry (using the industry median). For affiliated incumbents and affiliated entrants in market i at time t, BG Cash measures the average total cash held by the
firm-affiliated groups. This is computed by adding all the group subsidiaries’ Total Cash excluding the cash held by the firm (incumbent/entrant). Firms’ total cash
measures the sum of firms’ Net Liquid Assets and Operating Cash Flow. Nominal variables expressed in thousands of Euros have been deflated using sectoral prices
indexes.
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Table 6: Entrants and Incumbents
Entrants Incumbents
All BG Aff. SA All BG Aff. SA
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Assets Mean 154223 184781 6046 210078 234367 7491
Sd 797848 895565 62731 714309 739676 30695
p50 11642 20290 1044 42777 55811 2454
N 2995 2777 2883 3082 3064 3035
Employment Mean 790 974 55.5 936 1073 68.8
Sd 3570 4027 150 2589 2696 90.2
p50 144 227 30.5 341 434 47.5
N 2995 2777 2883 3082 3064 3035
VA/worker Mean 87 88.3 58.6 108 124 54.9
Sd 863 942 545 884 1183 65.6
p50 48.7 50.8 42.3 55.9 58.1 47.8
N 2988 2756 2861 3082 3063 3026
TFP Mean 3.05 3.07 3.04 3.05 3.05 3.05
Sd 0.462 0.46 0.458 0.459 0.459 0.458
p50 3.05 3.07 3.05 3.05 3.06 3.05
N 2347 2101 2221 2427 2419 2402
Own Total Cash Mean 165 -347 -290 69531 79155 4534
Sd 99484 108465 6799 174241 183075 16079
p50 -541 -1089 -78.2 22197 28704 1984
N 2995 2777 2883 3082 3064 3035
BG Total Cash Mean - 1904221 - - 2595051 -
Sd - 8822740 - - 7211362 -
p50 - 121979 - - 544934 -
N - 2777 - - 3064 -
Note: The table presents market-level variables. Nominal variables expressed in thousands of Euros have been
deflated using sectoral prices indexes. All variables are based on sales-weighted averages. TFP is estimated
using the methodology proposed by Olley and Pakes (1996). Own Total Cash measures the sum of firms’ Net
Liquid Assets and Operating Cash Flow. For affiliated firms, BG Total Cash measures the total cash held by
the firm-affiliated group. This is computed by adding all the group subsidiaries’ Total Cash, excluding the cash
held by the firm.
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Table 7: Entrants and Incumbents in High and Low BG-Cash Markets
PANEL A High BG Cash Low BG Cash
(1) (2)
Entry Rates Mean 17.5 14.8
St. Dev. 19.5 13.6
Median 11.5 11.7
N 1547 1536
Market Shares of Mean 82.3 62.9
Affiliated Incumbents St. Dev. 16.4 25.3
Median 86.8 67.5
N 1546 1536
Percentage of Mean 68.8 49.7
Affiliated Entrants St. Dev. 30.7 32.9
Median 79.7 51.5
N 1507 1488
PANEL B Affiliated Incumbents Stand-Alone Incumbents Affiliated Entrants Stand-Alone Entrants
High BG Cash Low BG Cash High BG Cash Low BG Cash High BG Cash Low BG Cash High BG Cash Low BG Cash
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Assets Mean 402333 64416 10650 4342 309849 52769 9523 2596
St. Dev. 1003807 155110 42318 8780 1219984 210273 88463 7280
Median 114962 27775 2916 2096 37295 10083 1254 857
N 1541 1523 1515 1520 1426 1351 1436 1447
Employment Mean 1661 478 76.4 61.2 1488 431 65.3 45.8
Sd 3568 1021 114 56.1 5393 1438 203 60.5
p50 686 295 50.1 45.2 345 158 33 28.5
N 1541 1523 1515 1520 1426 1351 1436 1447
VA/Worker Mean 158 90.2 61.1 48.7 121 54.2 74.8 42.7
Sd 1640 305 87.8 29.3 1312 68.3 759 145
p50 64.3 52.9 50.5 45.5 57 45.5 43.8 41.3
N 1540 1523 1507 1519 1416 1340 1420 1441
TFP Mean 3.17 2.93 3.17 2.93 3.18 2.94 3.17 2.92
Sd .451 .434 .449 .435 .45 .432 .451 .436
p50 3.16 2.92 3.16 2.92 3.17 2.92 3.17 2.91
N 1202 1217 1194 1208 1142 1077 1138 1150
Note: Nominal variables expressed in thousands of Euros have been deflated using sectoral price indexes. All variables are based on sales-weighted averages. High BG
Cash Markets are markets where the Total Cash of incumbent-affiliated groups is above the median value.
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Table 8: Business Groups: Portfolio of Industries
PANEL A: Sector relatedness
(based on industry classification)
All groups Mean p5 p25 p50 p75 p95 N
# of firms in the group 4.42 1 1 2 4 11 69614
% of firms outside manufacturing 31.4 0 0 33.3 50 80 69614
% of group cash held outside manuf. 42.5 0 0 48.6 68.8 100 69609
Within manufacturing:
Concentration within 3 digit sector (HHI) 0.899 0.44 1 1 1 1 69615
Concentration within 2 digit sector (HHI) 0.933 0.50 1 1 1 1 69615
% of firms in same 3-digit sector 76.1 12.5 50 100 100 100 91454
% of firms in same 2-digit but not 7.25 0 0 0 0 50 91454
same 3-digit sector
Entrant groups
# of firms in the group 8.28 1 2 3 6 24 16542
% of firms outside manufacturing 32.8 0 0 33.3 50 83.3 16542
% of group cash held outside manuf. 57.1 -6.13 0 51.1 81.8 118 16540
Within manufacturing:
% of firms in same 3-digit sector as the entrant 74.2 11.1 50 100 100 100 18926
% of firms in same 2-digit sector as the entrant 7.63 0 0 0 0 50 18926
but not same 3 digit sector
PANEL B: Maturity of Industries
All groups Mean p5 p25 p50 p75 p95 N
Within manufacturing:
Concentration within age decile (HHI) 0.888 0.417 1 1 1 1 69535
% of firms in sectors belonging to 75.6 16.7 50 100 100 100 91969
the same age decile
% of group cash from firms in sectors 75.6 0 50.6 100 100 100 91955
belonging to the same age decile
Entrant groups
Within manufacturing:
% of firms in sectors belonging to 72.8 14.3 50 100 100 100 18921
the same age decile as the entrant
% of group cash from firms belonging to 64.3 -13.4 16.6 100 100 100 18921
the same age decile as the entrant
Note: The table displays selected characteristics of all groups in the sample and of all entrant groups. For each
group in any given year, Panel A computes concentration as the sum of the squared values of the shares of
manufacturing units active in each 3-digit/2-digit sector. For each group in any given year, Panel B computes
concentration as the sum of the squared values of the shares of manufacturing units active in sectors belonging
to each age decile. Group Cash measures the total cash held by the firm-affiliated group. This is computed by
adding all the group subsidiaries’ Total Cash. Firms’ total cash measures the sum of firms’ Net Liquid Assets
and Operating Cash Flow. Some of the units in a group may have negative cash-holdings. This explains why
the ratio between group cash in a given subset of sectors and group total cash may turn out to be either negative
or larger than one. Nominal variables expressed in thousands of Euros have been deflated using sectoral prices
indexes.
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Table 9: Business Groups: Portfolio of Industries
PANEL A: Long-run growth
All groups Mean p5 p25 p50 p75 p95 N
Within manufacturing:
Concentration within long-run growth decile (HHI) 0.892 0.44 1 1 1 1 69617
% of firms in sectors belonging to 76.2 16.7 50 100 100 100 91360
the same long-run growth decile
% of group cash from firms in sectors belonging 76.1 0 54 100 100 100 91308
to the same long-run growth decile
Entrant groups
Within manufacturing:
% of firms in sectors belonging to the same 73.5 14.3 50 100 100 100 18931
long-run growth decile as the entrant
% of group cash from firms in sectors belonging 68.1 -13.3 19.7 100 100 100 18907
to the same long-run growth decile as the entrant
PANEL B: Innovation intensity
All groups Mean p5 p25 p50 p75 p95 N
Within manufacturing:
Concentration within patent growth decile (HHI) 0.908 0.5 1 1 1 1 69617
% of firms in sectors belonging to 78.9 16.7 50 100 100 100 88179
the same patent growth decile
% of group cash from firms in sectors belonging 78.9 0 70.4 100 100 100 88165
to the same patent growth decile
Entrant groups
Within manufacturing:
% of firms in sectors belonging to the same 77 15.4 50 100 100 100 18575
patent growth decile as the entrant
% of group cash from firms belonging to the same 70.4 -10.1 40.1 100 100 100 18566
patent growth decile as the entrant
Note: The table displays selected characteristics of all groups in the sample and of all entrant groups. For each
group in any given year, Panel A computes concentration as the sum of the squared values of the shares of
manufacturing units active in each 3-digit/2-digit sector. For each group in any given year, Panel B computes
concentration as the sum of the squared values of the shares of manufacturing units active in sectors belonging
to each patent growth decile. Group Cash measures the total cash held by the firm-affiliated group. This is
computed by adding all the group subsidiaries’ Total Cash. Firms’ total cash measures the sum of firms’ Net
Liquid Assets and Operating Cash Flow. Some of the units in a group may have negative cash-holdings. This
explains why the ratio between group cash in a given subset of sectors and group total cash may turn out to be
either negative or larger than one. Nominal variables expressed in thousands of Euros have been deflated using
sectoral prices indexes.
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Table 10: Business Group Liquidity And Entry
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Size -0.276*** -0.260*** -0.255*** -0.254***
(0.025) (0.023) (0.024) (0.024)
∆ Size -0.038*** -0.053*** -0.054*** -0.053***
(0.012) (0.015) (0.014) (0.014)
ROA 0.084*** 0.095*** 0.087** 0.087**
(0.031) (0.033) (0.036) (0.037)
Capital Intensity -0.008 -0.006 -0.008 -0.009
(0.010) (0.010) (0.012) (0.012)
HHI 0.121 0.149** 0.173** 0.169**
(0.075) (0.075) (0.076) (0.075)
Tangibility 0.019 0.014 0.019 0.013
(0.060) (0.063) (0.065) (0.066)
Average Efficiency 0.013 0.006 0.006 0.049
(0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.031)
Relative Efficiency -0.036 -0.015 -0.012 -0.010
(0.048) (0.050) (0.050) (0.049)
BG Affiliation -0.020** -0.026*** -0.026*** -0.025***
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
Inc. Total Cash -0.009*** -0.005 -0.005
(0.003) (0.004) (0.003)
BG Total Cash -0.007** -0.008***
(0.003) (0.003)
BG Total Cash × Average Efficiency -0.003*
(0.002)
Market & Year FE YES YES YES YES
R-squared 0.583 0.598 0.600 0.602
N 2239 2100 2050 2050
Note: Sectoral-level data between 1995 and 2004. Entry in sector i year t is the ratio of sales of entrant firms
over total sales in sector i year t. Size is the (log of) total sales; ∆ Size is the change in market size from t− 1
to t; ROA is the ratio of operating profits to total assets in a given market; Capital intensity is the ratio of fixed
assets over output; HHI is the Herfindhal index (firms’ market shares computed in terms of sales); Tangibility
is ratio of tangible assets to total assets; Average Efficiency is the (weighted) average of incumbents’ TFP;
Relative Efficiency is the ratio of TFP of large affiliated firms to TFP of small stand-alone firms; BG Affiliation
is the market share of group-affiliated incumbents; Inc. Total Cash is the incumbent firms’ total cash. BG
Total Cash is the total cash held by an incumbent-affiliated group. This is computed by adding all the group
subsidiaries’ cash holdings, excluding the cash held by the incumbent. Average Efficiency is normalised to have
zero mean. This allows to interpret the coefficient of BG Total Cash in Column 4 as the effect on the entry rate
when Average Efficiency is at its mean value. All market characteristics are computed as weighted averages.
See appendix A.1 for a detailed description of the variables. Robust standard errors clustered at the 3SIC sector
level in parentheses. One star denotes significance at the 10% level, two stars denote significance at the 5%
level, and three stars denote significance at the 1% level.
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Table 11: Group Liquidity and Entry: Access to External Capital
Tangibility Sectoral demand shocks
Low tang. High tang. Busts Booms
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Size -0.242*** -0.264*** -0.304*** -0.467***
(0.028) (0.031) (0.101) (0.074)
∆ Size -0.040** -0.087*** 0.138 0.090
(0.017) (0.019) (0.084) (0.061)
ROA 0.107** 0.074 -0.179*** 0.212**
(0.048) (0.049) (0.066) (0.092)
Capital Intensity -0.013 -0.007 -0.040*** -0.002
(0.028) (0.014) (0.011) (0.068)
HHI 0.143* 0.225 0.096 0.420*
(0.076) (0.177) (0.133) (0.241)
Tangibility 0.043 -0.051 -0.269 -0.381
(0.072) (0.144) (0.230) (0.218)
Average efficiency -0.002 0.038 0.015 0.197**
(0.024) (0.060) (0.053) (0.093)
Relative efficiency 0.001 -0.037 0.065 -0.139
(0.067) (0.068) (0.081) (0.177)
BG Affiliation -0.026** -0.032** -0.032 0.011
(0.012) (0.013) (0.035) (0.019)
Inc. Total Cash 0.000 -0.011** 0.001 0.006
(0.006) (0.005) (0.010) (0.009)
BG Total Cash -0.009** -0.002 -0.013*** 0.001
(0.004) (0.003) (0.005) (0.007)
Market & Year FE YES YES YES YES
R-squared 0.659 0.517 0.349 0.367
N 1013 1037 490 469
Note: We take the average over time of market Tangibility and we define as High-tangibility markets as those
markets where this time-invariant measure of tangibility is above the median value. We identify booms and
busts from the fluctuations of real sectoral sales, where nominal sales are deflated by industry price deflators.
We follow a peak-to-trough criterion, where a trough occurs when the (log) of real sales deviates from its trend
level by more than one standard deviation. For each trough, we go back in time until we find a local peak,
which is defined as the closest proceding year for which cyclical real sales (the difference between actual and
trend values) are higher than during the previous and posterior year. A bust goes from the year after the local
peak to the year of the trough. The same procedure is used to identify sectoral booms. A peak occurs when
current real sales are more than one standard deviation above their trend. Once identified a peak, we go back
in time until we find a local trough. The years falling between a local trough and a peak are labeled as a
boom. See appendix A.1 for a detailed description of the variables. Robust standard errors clustered at the
3SIC sector level in parentheses. One star denotes significance at the 10% level, two stars denote significance
at the 5% level, and three stars denote significance at the 1% level. The p-values on the difference between the
two coefficients of BG Total Cash being different from zero are 0.067 and 0.051.
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Table 12: Group Liquidity and Entry: Access to External Capital
Long-run growth Patents growth
High growth Low growth High growth Low growth
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Size -0.271*** -0.300*** -0.216*** -0.302***
(0.027) (0.044) (0.025) (0.037)
∆ Size -0.038** -0.045* -0.065*** -0.064**
(0.017) (0.026) (0.015) (0.028)
ROA 0.082 0.090* 0.143*** 0.071
(0.064) (0.051) (0.048) (0.050)
Capital Intensity 0.008 -0.014 -0.031 0.025
(0.030) (0.010) (0.039) (0.033)
HHI 0.163* 0.150 0.166** 0.194
(0.094) (0.114) (0.081) (0.164)
Tangibility -0.081 0.101 0.031 0.008
(0.086) (0.088) (0.071) (0.076)
Average efficiency -0.023 0.036 0.028 -0.028
(0.027) (0.044) (0.027) (0.028)
Relative efficiency 0.011 -0.019 -0.076 0.075
(0.071) (0.069) (0.077) (0.082)
BG Affiliation -0.016 -0.032*** -0.038*** -0.007
(0.013) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011)
Inc. Total Cash -0.005 -0.002 -0.008* -0.002
(0.005) (0.006) (0.004) (0.006)
BG Total Cash -0.009*** -0.0035 -0.014*** -0.001
(0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004)
Market & Year FE YES YES YES YES
R-squared 0.658 0.547 0.680 0.500
N 1026 1024 921 962
Note: Columns (1) and (2) classify industries based on the growth of the real value of sales during our sample
period, 1995-2004. The real value of sales is computed using industry price deflators. High-growth industries are
those where the growth of real sales exceeds the median growth of all manufacturing industries. Columns (3)
and (4) classify sectors based on the number of patents awarded by the European Patent Office to French firms
over the period 1995-2003, at the (4 digit) sectoral level. High growth industries are those where the growth
of awarded patents is above the median. See appendix A.1 for a detailed description of the variables. Robust
standard errors clustered at the 3SIC sector level in parentheses. One star denotes significance at the 10% level,
two stars denote significance at the 5% level, and three stars denote significance at the 1% level. The p-values
on the difference between the two coefficients of BG Total Cash being different from zero are 0.108 and 0.005.
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Table 13: External Financial Dependence
ISIC Code NAF Code Industrial Sector External dependence
311 15.1-15.8 Food products 0.1368
313 15.9 Beverages 0.0772
314 16 Tobacco -0.4512
321 17 Textiles 0.4005
322 18.1/18.2 Wearing apparel, except footwear 0.0286
323 19.1/19.2/18.3 Leather products -0.1400
324 19.3 Footwear -0.078
331 20 Wood products, except furniture 0.2840
332 36.1 Furniture except metal 0.2357
341 21 Paper and products 0.1756
342 22 Printing and publishing 0.2038
352 24.2-24.7 Other chemicals 0.2187
353 23.2 Petroleum refining 0.0420
354 23.1 Misc. petroleum and coal products 0.3341
355 25.1 Rubber products 0.2265
356 25.2 Plastic products 1.1401
361 26.2-26.4 Pottery, china, earthenware -0.1459
362 26.1 Glass and glass products 0.5285
369 26.5-26.8 Other non-metallic products 0.0620
371 27.1-27.3/27.5 Iron and steel 0.0871
372 27.4 Non-ferrous metals 0.0055
381 28 Fabricated metal products 0.2371
382 29/30 Machinery, except electrical 0.4453
383 31/32 Machinery, electrical 0.7675
384 34/35 Transport equipment 0.3069
385 33 Prof and scient equipment 0.9610
390 36.2-36.6 Other manufactured products 0.4702
3511 24.1 Industrial chemicals 0.2050
Note: External financial dependence is the share of capital expenditures not financed with cash flow from
operations; this is computed for U.S. publicly listed companies in the period 1986-1995 and then aggregated
over time and across companies in a given industry (using the industry median).
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Table 14: Group Liquidity and Entry: Needs for External Funds and ICM activity
External Dependence Number of Fin. Interm.
High FD Low FD High FI Low FI
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Size -0.213*** -0.330*** -0.266*** -0.215***
(0.027) (0.023) (0.026) (0.037)
∆ Size -0.055** -0.034* -0.052*** -0.59**
(0.021) (0.019) (0.013) (0.024)
ROA 0.113** 0.029 0.161** 0.053
(0.051) (0.060) (0.072) (0.042)
Capital Intensity -0.048* -0.026** -0.018 0.009
(0.025) (0.011) (0.012) (0.036)
HHI 0.044 0.254** 0.079 0.211
(0.101) (0.119) (0.080) (0.154)
Tangibility 0.098 0.017 0.013 0.038
(0.095) (0.075) (0.079) (0.104)
Financial Intermediaries 0.001 0.001
(0.001) (0.002)
Average efficiency 0.005 0.018 0.011 0.028
(0.026) (0.056) (0.029) (0.046)
Relative efficiency -0.050 0.004 -0.091 0.034
(0.073) (0.064) (0.092) (0.055)
BG Affiliation -0.017 -0.038*** -0.040*** -0.003
(0.012) (0.012) (0.013) (0.014)
Inc. Total Cash -0.004 -0.008 -0.002 -0.002
(0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.007)
BG Total Cash -0.009** -0.004 -0.008** -0.004
(0.0036) (0.0026) (0.003) (0.004)
Market & Year FE YES YES YES YES
R-squared 0.578 0.652 0.751 0.346
N 1134 916 1026 1023
Note: High-FD industries are those where external financial dependence is above the median value. Columns (3)
and (4) classify industries based on the number of financial intermediaries of incumbents-affiliated groups. High-
FI industries are those where incumbents are affiliated with groups whose number of financial intermediaries is
above the median value. See appendix A.1 for a detailed description of the variables. Robust standard errors
clustered at the 3SIC sector level in parentheses. One star denotes significance at the 10% level, two stars
denote significance at the 5% level, and three stars denote significance at the 1% level. The p-values on the
difference between the two coefficients of BG Total Cash being different from zero are 0.107 and 0.20.
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Table 15: BG affiliated vs. Stand-alone Entry (3-eq. SURE)
EntryBGi,t Entry
SA
i,t Entryi,t Entry
BG
i,t Entry
SA
i,t Entryi,t
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Size -0.227*** -0.023*** -0.251*** -0.226*** -0.023*** -0.249***
(0.015) (0.005) (0.015) (0.015) (0.005) (0.015)
∆ Size -0.071*** 0.001 -0.069*** -0.071*** 0.001 -0.070***
(0.012) (0.004) (0.012) (0.012) (0.004) (0.012)
ROA 0.154*** 0.001 0.155*** 0.158*** 0.001 0.159***
(0.031) (0.010) (0.031) (0.031) (0.010) (0.031)
Capital Intensity 0.023 -0.003 0.020 0.023 -0.003 0.020
(0.015) (0.005) (0.015) (0.015) (0.005) (0.015)
HHI 0.007 0.047*** 0.054 0.007 0.047*** 0.054
(0.057) (0.018) (0.056) (0.057) (0.018) (0.056)
Tangibility 0.093* -0.044*** 0.049 0.097* -0.044*** 0.054
(0.053) (0.017) (0.053) (0.053) (0.017) (0.053)
Average Efficiency -0.032* -0.008 -0.040* -0.033* -0.008 -0.040*
(0.017) (0.005) (0.017) (0.017) (0.005) (0.017)
Relative Efficiency 0.082** 0.013 0.095** 0.083** 0.013 0.095**
(0.040) (0.013) (0.040) (0.040) (0.013) (0.040)
BG Affiliation -0.021** 0.000 -0.021** -0.022** 0.000 -0.022**
(0.009) (0.003) (0.009) (0.009) (0.003) (0.009)
Inc. Total Cash -0.009** 0.000 -0.009** -0.009** 0.000 -0.009**
(0.004) (0.001) (0.004) (0.004) (0.001) (0.004)
(Inc.) BG Total Cash -0.006** -0.001* -0.007*** -0.006** -0.001* -0.007***
(0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002)
Entrant BG Total Cash 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.004*** 0.004***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Inc.BG Eff./Entr.BG Eff -0.003** -0.003** -0.003** -0.003**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
(Inc.) BG TC × Entr. BG TC 0.001* 0.001*
(0.000) (0.000)
Market & Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
R-squared 0.768 0.702 0.759 0.768 0.702 0.759
N 1383 1383
Note: Entrybgi,t (Entry
sa
i,t) is the ratio of sales of affiliated entrants (stand-alone entrants) over total sales in
sector i year t. Entryi,t is the total entry rate in sector i year t. Entrant BG Total Cash is the total cash of
the group entrant firms are affiliated with. It is computed adding the total cash held by all the group-affiliated
units. In the regressions we use the lagged value, i.e. the total cash of the group an entrant is affiliated with
measured in the year prior to entry. Inc. BG Eff./Entr. BG Eff. is the ratio of the efficiency of established
business groups to that of the entrant business groups. Group efficiency is computed by averaging the TFP of
units active in manufacturing using as weights each unit’s share of sales over the group total sales. (Inc.) BG
Total Cash and Entrant BG Total Cash are normalised to have zero mean. See appendix A.1 for a detailed
description of the variables. Robust standard errors clustered at the 3SIC sector level in parentheses. One
star denotes significance at the 10% level, two stars denote significance at the 5% level, and three stars denote
significance at the 1% level.
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Table 16: BG affiliated vs. Stand-alone Entry (3-eq. SURE)
EntryBGi,t Entry
SA
i,t Entryi,t
(1) (2) (3)
Size -0.225*** -0.023*** -0.249***
(0.015) (0.005) (0.015)
∆ Size -0.074*** 0.001 -0.073***
(0.012) (0.004) (0.012)
ROA 0.150*** 0.001 0.151***
(0.031) (0.010) (0.031)
Capital Intensity 0.021 -0.003 0.018
(0.016) (0.005) (0.015)
HHI 0.006 0.048*** 0.054
(0.057) (0.018) (0.057)
Tangibility 0.094* -0.044*** 0.050
(0.053) (0.017) (0.053)
Average Efficiency -0.032* -0.008 -0.040*
(0.017) (0.005) (0.017)
Relative Efficiency 0.079* 0.012 0.091**
(0.040) (0.013) (0.040)
BG Affiliation -0.020** -0.000 -0.020**
(0.009) (0.003) (0.009)
Inc. Total Cash -0.009** 0.000 -0.009**
(0.004) (0.001) (0.004)
(Inc.) BG Total Cash -0.006*** -0.001* -0.007***
(0.002) (0.001) (0.002)
Entrant BG Total Cash 0.007*** 0.007***
(0.002) (0.002)
Inc.BG Eff./Entr.BG Eff -0.003** -0.003**
(0.001) (0.001)
Young Sector 0.006 0.006
(0.031) (0.031)
Entrant BG Age 0.073 0.073
(0.155) (0.155)
Entrant BG Cash × Entrant BG Age -0.010 -0.010
(0.011) (0.011)
Entrant BG Cash × Young Sector -0.001 -0.001
(0.002) (0.002)
Young Sector × Entrant BG Age -0.503** -0.503**
(0.204) (0.204)
Entrant BG Cash × Young Sector 0.037** 0.037**
× Entrant BG Age (0.015) (0.015)
Market & Year FE YES YES YES
R-squared 0.770 0.692 0.761
N 1370
Note: Entrybgi,t (Entry
sa
i,t) is the ratio of sales of affiliated entrants (stand-alone entrants) over total sales in
sector i year t. Entryi,t is the total entry rate in sector i year t. Sectoral Age is the average age of all of the
firms active in market i at time t. Young Sector is a dummy variable which takes value one when the age of the
sector where entry takes place is below the median value. Entrant BG Age is the (weighted) average age of the
industries where entrants’ affiliated units are active, using as weights the share of each unit’s sales over total
group sales. See appendix A.1 for a detailed description of the variables. Robust standard errors clustered at
the 3SIC sector level in parentheses. One star denotes significance at the 10% level, two stars denote significance
at the 5% level, and three stars denote significance at the 1% level.
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Table 17: BG Affiliated vs. Stand-Alone Entry: Long-run growth and Patent growth
Long-run growth Patent growth
Low growth High growth Low growth High growth
EntryBGi,t Entry
SA
i,t Entryi,t Entry
BG
i,t Entry
SA
i,t Entryi,t Entry
BG
i,t Entry
SA
i,t Entryi,t Entry
BG
i,t Entry
SA
i,t Entryi,t
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Size -0.244*** -0.016* -0.260*** -0.268*** -0.026*** -0.294*** -0.258*** -0.026*** -0.284*** -0.203*** -0.023*** -0.226***
(0.027) (0.008) (0.027) (0.020) (0.007) (0.020) (0.026) (0.008) (0.026) (0.019) (0.006) (0.018)
∆ Size -0.082*** -0.012* -0.093*** -0.039*** 0.007 -0.032** -0.119*** 0.002 -0.117*** -0.057*** 0.002 -0.055***
(0.022) (0.007) (0.021) (0.014) (0.005) (0.014) (0.022) (0.007) (0.022) (0.014) (0.005) (0.013)
ROA 0.148*** 0.008 0.157*** 0.153*** -0.007 0.145*** 0.164*** -0.002 0.162*** 0.136*** 0.007 0.143***
(0.049) (0.015) (0.049) (0.039) (0.013) (0.039) (0.040) (0.012) (0.040) (0.048) (0.016) (0.047)
Capital Intensity -0.049 -0.013 -0.062** 0.032* -0.001 0.030* -0.009 0.005 -0.005 -0.043** -0.008 -0.051**
(0.031) (0.010) (0.031) (0.018) (0.006) (0.018) (0.024) (0.007) (0.024) (0.020) (0.007) (0.019)
HHI -0.224** 0.027 -0.197* 0.096 0.044** 0.140** 0.126 0.043 0.169* -0.082 0.052** -0.030
(0.104) (0.032) (0.103) (0.068) (0.022) (0.068) (0.098) (0.030) (0.099) (0.069) (0.023) (0.068)
Tangibility 0.152* -0.071*** 0.080 -0.016 -0.026 -0.042 0.015 -0.030 -0.015 0.149** -0.055** 0.094
(0.081) (0.025) (0.080) (0.068) (0.022) (0.068) (0.081) (0.025) (0.082) (0.069) (0.023) (0.067)
Average efficiency -0.085*** -0.012 -0.097*** 0.005 -0.010 -0.005 0.007 -0.019** -0.012 -0.053** -0.002 -0.055**
(0.032) (0.010) (0.031) (0.021) (0.007) (0.021) (0.028) (0.009) (0.028) (0.021) (0.007) (0.021)
Relative efficiency -0.072 0.002 -0.069 -0.066 0.020 -0.046 0.116* 0.057*** 0.173** 0.071 0.011 0.082*
(0.056) (0.017) (0.056) (0.056) (0.018) (0.056) (0.069) (0.021) (0.070) (0.049) (0.016) (0.048)
BG Affiliation -0.006 -0.000 -0.006 -0.035*** 0.001 -0.034*** -0.015 0.003 -0.011 -0.029** -0.003 -0.032***
(0.013) (0.004) (0.013) (0.013) (0.004) (0.013) (0.014) (0.004) (0.014) (0.012) (0.004) (0.012)
Inc. Total Cash -0.004 -0.001 -0.005 -0.009** 0.001 -0.008* -0.008* -0.000 -0.009* -0.008 0.001 -0.007
(0.006) (0.002) (0.006) (0.004) (0.001) (0.004) (0.005) (0.001) (0.005) (0.005) (0.002) (0.005)
(Inc.) BG Total Cash 0.001 0.000 0.001 -0.010*** -0.002** -0.012*** 0.004 -0.001 0.003 -0.014*** -0.003** -0.017***
(0.003) (0.001) (0.003) (0.003) (0.001) (0.003) (0.003) (0.001) (0.003) (0.003) (0.001) (0.003)
Entrant BG Total Cash 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.003* 0.003* 0.006*** 0.006***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
Inc. BG Eff./Entr. BG Eff. -0.001 -0.001 -0.003** -0.003** -0.001 -0.001 -0.005** -0.005**
(0.004) (0.004) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.003)
(Inc.) BG TC × Entr. BG TC 0.000 0.000 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Market & Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
R-squared 0.704 0.647 0.700 0.819 0.743 0.809 0.737 0.710 0.719 0.803 0.702 0.802
N 650 733 649 734
Note: Columns (1) to (6) classify industries based on the growth of the real value of sales during our sample period, 1995-2004. The real value of sales is computed
using industry price deflators. High-growth industries are those where the growth of real sales exceeds the median growth of all manufacturing industries. Columns (7)
to (12) classify sectors based on the number of patents awarded by the European Patent Office to French firms over the period 1995-2003, at the (4 digit) sectoral level.
High growth industries are those where the growth of awarded patents is above the median. (Inc.) BG Total Cash and Entrant BG Total Cash are normalised to have
zero mean. See appendix A.1 for a detailed description of the variables. Robust standard errors clustered at the 3SIC sector level in parentheses. One star denotes
significance at the 10% level, two stars denote significance at the 5% level, and three stars denote significance at the 1% level. The p-values on the difference between
the coefficients of Entrants’ BG Total Cash being different from zero are 0.08 and 0.09. The p-values on the difference between the coefficients of Incumbents’ BG Total
Cash are 0.005 and 0.0001 for BG affiliated entrants, and 0.08 and 0.08 for SA entrants.
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Table 18: BG Affiliated vs. Stand-Alone Entry: Booms and busts and Tangibility
Booms and busts Tangibility
Busts Booms Low tangibility High tangibility
EntryBGi,t Entry
SA
i,t Entryi,t Entry
BG
i,t Entry
SA
i,t Entryi,t Entry
BG
i,t Entry
SA
i,t Entryi,t Entry
BG
i,t Entry
SA
i,t Entryi,t
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Size -0.200*** 0.003 -0.198*** -0.227*** -0.050*** -0.276*** -0.211*** -0.019*** -0.230*** -0.242*** -0.031*** -0.273***
(0.033) (0.012) (0.030) (0.034) (0.010) (0.034) (0.021) (0.006) (0.021) (0.022) (0.009) (0.022)
∆ Size 0.128*** -0.036*** 0.093*** -0.072** -0.001 -0.073** -0.051*** 0.000 -0.051*** -0.109*** 0.004 -0.105***
(0.029) (0.011) (0.027) (0.031) (0.009) (0.030) (0.016) (0.004) (0.016) (0.018) (0.007) (0.018)
ROA 0.007 0.005 0.012 0.208*** -0.005 0.202*** 0.161*** 0.014 0.176*** 0.181*** -0.034* 0.147***
(0.051) (0.019) (0.046) (0.056) (0.016) (0.054) (0.043) (0.011) (0.042) (0.045) (0.018) (0.045)
Capital Intensity -0.088* -0.016 -0.105** -0.077* -0.029** -0.106** -0.005 -0.001 -0.006 0.033* -0.004 0.029*
(0.045) (0.017) (0.042) (0.045) (0.013) (0.044) (0.026) (0.007) (0.026) (0.017) (0.007) (0.018)
HHI -0.257* -0.031 -0.288** -0.547*** 0.152*** -0.395*** -0.004 0.050** 0.046 0.014 0.027 0.041
(0.140) (0.053) (0.129) (0.156) (0.043) (0.152) (0.077) (0.020) (0.076) (0.090) (0.036) (0.091)
Tangibility -0.376*** -0.127** -0.504*** 0.013 -0.082*** -0.070 0.109 -0.033* 0.076 0.001 -0.027 -0.026
(0.135) (0.051) (0.124) (0.106) (0.029) (0.103) (0.073) (0.019) (0.072) (0.094) (0.037) (0.095)
Average efficiency -0.067** -0.030*** -0.097*** -0.113*** -0.021* -0.134*** 0.027 -0.001 0.026 -0.070** -0.025** -0.095***
(0.029) (0.011) (0.027) (0.041) (0.011) (0.040) (0.022) (0.006) (0.022) (0.030) (0.012) (0.030)
Relative efficiency 0.230*** 0.106*** 0.336*** 0.190*** 0.033 0.223*** -0.076 0.004 -0.072 0.141** 0.034 0.175**
(0.062) (0.023) (0.057) (0.074) (0.021) (0.072) (0.057) (0.015) (0.057) (0.056) (0.022) (0.056)
BG Affiliation 0.007 -0.004 0.003 -0.002 -0.010** -0.012 -0.024* -0.002 -0.026* -0.019 0.003 -0.016
(0.017) (0.007) (0.016) (0.016) (0.004) (0.015) (0.014) (0.004) (0.014) (0.012) (0.005) (0.012)
Inc. Total Cash -0.013** -0.002 -0.015** 0.005 -0.003* 0.002 -0.000 -0.001 -0.001 -0.018*** 0.002 -0.016***
(0.006) (0.002) (0.006) (0.005) (0.002) (0.005) (0.005) (0.001) (0.005) (0.004) (0.002) (0.004)
(Inc.) BG Total Cash -0.009** -0.003* -0.012*** 0.001 0.001 0.003 -0.009** -0.003*** -0.012*** 0.001 -0.001 -0.000
(0.004) (0.002) (0.004) (0.004) (0.001) (0.004) (0.004) (0.001) (0.003) (0.003) (0.001) (0.003)
Entrant BG Total Cash 0.009*** 0.009*** 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.003*** 0.003***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
Inc. BG Eff./Entr. BG Eff. -0.021*** -0.021*** -0.002 -0.002 -0.003** -0.003** 0.002 0.002
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
(Inc.) BG TC × Entr. BG TC 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001* 0.001* 0.000 0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000)
Market & Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
R-squared 0.754 0.857 0.812 0.850 0.882 0.847 0.787 0.746 0.781 0.743 0.669 0.732
N 358 454 683 700
Note: We identify busts and booms from the fluctuations of real sectoral sales, where nominal sales are deflated by industry price deflators. See Table 11 for a description
of the methodology. We take the average over time of market Tangibility and we define as High-tangibility markets as those markets where this time-invariant measure of
tangibility is above the median value. (Inc.) BG Total Cash and Entrant BG Total Cash are normalised to have zero mean. See appendix A.1 for a detailed description
of the variables. Robust standard errors clustered at the 3SIC sector level in parentheses. One star denotes significance at the 10% level, two stars denote significance
at the 5% level, and three stars denote significance at the 1% level. The p-values on the difference between the coefficients of Entrants’ BG Total Cash being different
from zero are 0.13 and 0.1. The p-values on the difference between the coefficients of Incumbents’ BG Total Cash are 0.04 and 0.02 for BG affiliated entrants, and 0.04
and 0.07 for SA entrants.
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Table 19: BG Affiliated vs. Stand-Alone Entry: Financial Dependence
Low FD High FD
EntryBGi,t Entry
SA
i,t Entryi,t Entry
BG
i,t Entry
SA
i,t Entryi,t
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Size -0.295*** -0.018** -0.313*** -0.197*** -0.024*** -0.221***
(0.027) (0.009) (0.027) (0.018) (0.006) (0.018)
∆ Size -0.094*** 0.001 -0.093*** -0.045*** 0.001 -0.044***
(0.020) (0.007) (0.020) (0.014) (0.004) (0.014)
ROA 0.059 0.005 0.064 0.200*** 0.002 0.201***
(0.053) (0.017) (0.052) (0.037) (0.012) (0.038)
Capital Intensity -0.016 -0.011 -0.027 -0.040** -0.006 -0.046**
(0.024) (0.008) (0.023) (0.020) (0.006) (0.020)
HHI 0.107 0.027 0.134 -0.180** 0.057** -0.123
(0.087) (0.029) (0.085) (0.075) (0.023) (0.075)
Tangibility 0.161** -0.055** 0.106 0.015 -0.028 -0.012
(0.077) (0.025) (0.075) (0.071) (0.022) (0.072)
Average efficiency -0.025*** -0.023** -0.057*** 0.005 -0.003 0.002
(0.006) (0.010) (0.017) (0.021) (0.007) (0.021)
Relative efficiency 0.110** 0.020 0.130** 0.052 0.005 0.057
(0.051) (0.017) (0.050) (0.062) (0.020) (0.063)
BG Affiliation -0.020 -0.001 -0.021* -0.019 0.000 -0.020
(0.013) (0.004) (0.012) (0.013) (0.004) (0.013)
Inc. Total Cash -0.009 -0.001 -0.010* -0.006 0.001 -0.005
(0.006) (0.002) (0.006) (0.004) (0.001) (0.004)
(Inc.) BG Total Cash -0.003 -0.001 -0.004 -0.006*** -0.002** -0.008***
(0.002) (0.001) (0.003) (0.002) (0.0008) (0.003)
Entrant BG Total Cash 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.006*** 0.006***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Inc. BG Eff./Entr. BG Eff. -0.001 -0.001 -0.013*** -0.013***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.003)
(Inc.) BG TC× Entr. BG TC 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000)
Market & Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
R-squared 0.784 0.763 0.780 0.780 0.632 0.767
N 616 767
Note: High-FD industries are those where external financial dependence is above the median value. External financial dependence is the share of capital expenditures
not financed with cash flow from operations. (Inc.) BG Total Cash and Entrant BG Total Cash are normalised to have zero mean. See appendix A.1 for a detailed
description of the variables. Robust standard errors clustered at the 3SIC sector level in parentheses. One star denotes significance at the 10% level, two stars denote
significance at the 5% level, and three stars denote significance at the 1% level. The p-values on the difference between the coefficients of Entrants’ BG Total Cash
being different from zero is 0.08. The p-values on the difference between the coefficients of Incumbents’ BG Total Cash are 0.1 for BG affiliated entrants, and 0.12 for
SA entrants.
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Table 20: Exit of Recent Entrants
PANEL A
% of Entrants at time t that leave All BG SA N
the industry within 5 years after entry 68.7 19.3 49.4 2778
PANEL B
Quartiles
Mean St.Dev. p25 p50 p75 N
Exit rate of entrants 13.0 12.8 3.7 11.8 17.9 1851
in 3 to 5 years (unweigthed)
Exit rate of BG entrants 4.0 8.9 0 0 4.5 1851
in 3 to 5 years (unweigthed)
Exit rate of entrants 16.6 23.1 0.2 7.6 21.9 1851
in 3 to 5 years (weigthed)
Exit rate of BG entrants 10.2 21.1 0 0 9.0 1851
in 3 to 5 years (weigthed)
Note: Sectoral-level data between 1995 and 2004. We define as Entrants in market i at time t all firms that
appear at time t and were not active at time t − 1. An entrant at time t exits from the market at time t + x
if it is active at time t + x but is no longer active at time t + x + 1. The (unweighted) Exit Rate of entrants
measures the percentage of entrants in market i at time t that exit from market i in the 3 to 5 years after entry.
The (weighted) Exit Rate of entrants measures the percentage of entrants’ sales in market i at time t that is
accounted for by those entrants that exit from market i in the 3 to 5 years after entry.
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Table 21: Exit of Recent Entrants (3-eq. SURE)
ExitBGi,t Exit
SA
i,t Exiti,t
Size -0.082*** -0.035 -0.117***
(0.024) (0.022) (0.032)
∆ Size 0.031 -0.002 0.029
(0.020) (0.018) (0.026)
ROA 0.021 -0.000 0.021
(0.035) (0.032) (0.046)
Capital Intensity 0.014 -0.040*** -0.026
(0.017) (0.015) (0.022)
HHI 0.326*** 0.010 0.335***
(0.072) (0.065) (0.094)
Tangibility -0.173*** 0.019 -0.154*
(0.063) (0.057) (0.082)
Average Efficiency -0.012 0.004 -0.009
(0.020) (0.018) (0.025)
Relative Efficiency 0.011 -0.009 0.002
(0.044) (0.039) (0.057)
BG Affiliation -0.014 -0.002 -0.015
(0.010) (0.009) (0.013)
Inc. Total Cash 0.005 -0.008** -0.004
(0.004) (0.004) (0.006)
(Inc.) BG Total Cash 0.006** 0.005** 0.011***
(0.003) (0.002) (0.003)
(Entrant) BG Total Cash -0.002* -0.002*
(0.001) (0.001)
Inc. BG Eff/Entr. BG Eff. 0.000 0.000
(0.001) (0.001)
Market & Year FE YES YES YES
R-squared 0.500 0.620 0.561
716
Note: Exitbgi,t (Exit
sa
i,t) measures the percentage of entrants’ sales in market i at time t that is accounted for
by those affiliated (stand-alone)entrants that exit from market i in the 3 to 5 years after entry. Exiti,t is the
total exit rate in the 3 to 5 years after entry of entrants in sector i year t. Entrant BG Total Cash is the
total cash of the group entrant firms are affiliated with. It is computed adding the total cash held by all the
group-affiliated units. In the regressions we use the lagged value, i.e. the total cash of the group an entrant is
affiliated with measured in the year prior to entry. Inc. BG Eff./Entr. BG Eff. is the ratio of the efficiency of
established business groups to that of the entrant business groups. Group efficiency is computed by averaging
the TFP of units active in manufacturing using as weights each unit’s share of sales over the group total sales.
See appendix A.1 for a detailed description of the variables. Robust standard errors clustered at the 3SIC sector
level in parentheses. One star denotes significance at the 10% level, two stars denote significance at the 5%
level, and three stars denote significance at the 1% level.
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Table 22: Business Group Liquidity And Entry: Additional Evidence
(1) (2) (3)
Size -0.268*** -0.270*** -0.255***
(0.026) (0.026) (0.024)
∆ Size -0.039** -0.044*** -0.054***
(0.015) (0.015) (0.014)
ROA 0.076* 0.077* 0.086**
(0.041) (0.041) (0.037)
Capital Intensity -0.010 -0.011 -0.008
(0.010) (0.011) (0.012)
HHI 0.134* 0.142* 0.172**
(0.073) (0.074) (0.076)
Tangibility 0.039 0.035 0.019
(0.070) (0.071) (0.066)
Average Efficiency 0.007 0.009 0.006
(0.025) (0.025) (0.025)
Relative Efficiency -0.013 -0.016 -0.012
(0.048) (0.049) (0.050)
BG Affiliation -0.030*** -0.030*** -0.026***
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
Incumbent Total Cash -0.006 -0.007* -0.005
(0.004) (0.004) (0.003)
BG Cash Shock−i,t 0.023***
(0.008)
BG Cash Shock+i,t -0.006
(0.006)
BG Total Cash -0.007**
(0.003)
Incumbent Loans from BG -0.005
(0.034)
Market & Year FE YES YES YES
R-squared 0.612 0.610 0.600
N 1957 1957 2050
Note: Shock−i,t indicates a negative shock to group liquidity in year t and takes a value one if there is a fall in
group cash flows of more than 10% year t relative to the previous year, and zero otherwise. Shock+i,t indicates a
positive shock and takes a value one if there is an increase in group cash flows of more than 10% in year t relative
to the previous year and zero otherwise. Incumbent Loans from BG measures loans granted to incumbents by
other members of the affiliated group, divided by incumbents’ total assets in the market. See appendix A.1 for
a detailed description of the variables. Robust standard errors clustered at the 3SIC sector level in parentheses.
One star denotes significance at the 10% level, two stars denote significance at the 5% level, and three stars
denote significance at the 1% level.
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A Appendix
A.1 Variable Description
Unweighted variables:
• Size: Log of total sales in the market;
• ∆ Size: Difference between the log of total sales in t and the log of total sales in t− 1;
• HHI: Herfindahl index of the market. HHI is computed as the sum of the squares of the
market shares of all firms in the market;
• BG Affiliation: Total market share of BG-affiliated incumbents in the market;
• Age: Average age of all the firms active in market i at year t.
The following variables have been computed as weighted averages of firm-level variables using all
firms in the market. Weights are the individual market shares in terms of sales. The firm-level
variables are defined as follows:
• ROA: Firms’ operating cash flow divided by total assets in the market;
• Capital Intensity: Firms’ fixed assets divided by their total sales in the market;
• Tangibility: Firms’ tangible assets divided by their total assets in the market;
The following variables have been computed as weighted averages of incumbent firms variables
or of variables referred to the group firms are affiliated with, using as weights the market shares.
The firm- or group-level variables are defined below:
• Inc. Total Cash: incumbent firms’ total cash. Total Cash is defined as the sum of Net
Liquid Assets and Operating Cash Flow. Net Liquid Assets is computed as current assets
(cash and cash equivalents, marketable securities, accounts receivable, inventories) minus
current liabilities (debt due within one year, payables) minus inventories. Operating cash
flow is computed as the difference between a firms’ EBIDTA and variation in working
capital;
• Average Efficiency. Wemeasure Efficiency of incumbent firms j in market i at year t using
estimates of firm-level total factor productivity (TFP). To compute TFP we use the semi-
parametric method first introduced by Olley and Pakes (1996). This methodology allows
us to tackle both simultaneity and selection issues involved when trying to consistently
estimate the parameters of the production function. To implement the procedure we
deflate nominal variables at the two-digit SIC level using price deflators provided by
INSEE. The Olley and Pakes (1996) methodology estimates the production function in
three steps. As a first step we regress log value added on labor and a polynomial of third
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degree in investment and capital. The resulting estimate for labor is consistent and can
be used to construct residuals of log value added. The second step then accounts for
selection using a Heckman-type control function. We thus estimate the probability of
survival by estimating a probit model of the exit decision on a power series of order three
in investment and capital. This allows us to define the estimated probability of exiting
and to include it in the final step to correct for the selection bias due to attrition. In the
final step we obtain the capital coefficient in the production function by approximating
the unobserved productivity shock with a nonparametric function of investment, current
capital stock and the probability of survival. This last step addresses the simultaneity
bias assuming that the investment function can be inverted. Consistent estimation of
labor and capital then allows us to construct our firm-level productivity measures.
• Relative Efficiency: Ratio between TFP of large affiliated incumbents and TFP of small
stand-alone incumbents. Large affiliated incumbents are those belonging to the top quar-
tile of the distribution of affiliated firms’ size. Small stand-alone incumbents are those
belonging to the bottom quartile of the distribution of stand-alone firms’ size.
• (Inc.) BG Total Cash: total cash held by incumbent-affiliated groups. For each group,
this is computed by adding all the group subsidiaries’ cash holdings, excluding the cash
held by the incumbent;
• Financial Intermediaries: Total number of financial intermediaries owned by the group;
• Loans of Inc. From BG: Loans granted to incumbents by other members of the affiliated
group, divided by incumbents’ total assets in the market.
• Entrant BG Total Cash: total cash held by entrant-affiliated groups. For each group, this
is computed by adding the cash holdings of all the group subsidiaries. In the regressions
we use the lagged value, i.e. the total cash of the group an entrant is affiliated with,
measured in the year prior to entry.
• Inc BG Eff./Entr. BG Eff.: Ratio between the efficiency of the incumbent-affiliated
groups and the efficiency of the entrant-affiliated groups. Group efficiency is computed
by averaging the TFP of units active in manufacturing (excluding the incumbent/entrant)
using as weights each unit’s share of sales over the group total sales.
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A.2 Robustness Checks
Table 23: Business Group Liquidity And Entry: Employment-weighted Entry Rates
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Size -0.225*** -0.199*** -0.191*** -0.190***
(0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026)
∆ Size -0.032** -0.048*** -0.050*** -0.049***
(0.013) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015)
ROA 0.109*** 0.119*** 0.112*** 0.111***
(0.039) (0.040) (0.035) (0.037)
Capital Intensity -0.016 -0.010 -0.016 -0.017
(0.011) (0.013) (0.015) (0.014)
HHI 0.168* 0.182** 0.202** 0.198**
(0.086) (0.082) (0.084) (0.084)
Tangibility 0.018 0.009 -0.007 -0.016
(0.066) (0.074) (0.077) (0.078)
Average Efficiency -0.009 -0.015 -0.014 0.052
(0.026) (0.026) (0.025) (0.034)
Relative Efficiency -0.054 -0.045 -0.041 -0.044
(0.059) (0.060) (0.061) (0.056)
BG Affiliation -0.020* -0.026** -0.026** -0.024**
(0.011) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012)
Inc. Total Cash -0.017*** -0.014** -0.014**
(0.006) (0.007) (0.007)
BG Total Cash -0.010*** -0.011***
(0.003) (0.003)
BG Total Cash × Average Efficiency -0.004*
(0.002)
Market & Year FE YES YES YES YES
R-squared 0.431 0.442 0.449 0.450
N 2239 2100 2050 2050
Note: Sectoral-level data between 1995 and 2004. Entry in sector i year t is the ratio of employment of entrant
firms over total employment in sector i year t. See appendix A.1 for a detailed description of the variables.
Average Efficiency is normalised to have zero mean. This allows to interpret the coefficient of BG Total Cash
in Column 4 as the effect on the entry rate when Average Efficiency is at its mean value. Robust standard
errors clustered at the 3SIC sector level in parentheses. One star denotes significance at the 10% level, two stars
denote significance at the 5% level, and three stars denote significance at the 1% level.
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Table 24: BG Liquidity And Entry: Age of the industry and sectoral trends
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Size -0.276*** -0.260*** -0.254*** -0.255*** -0.041*** -0.095*** -0.089*** -0.087***
(0.024) (0.022) (0.023) (0.023) (0.008) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012)
∆ Size -0.039*** -0.053*** -0.054*** -0.053*** -0.037*** -0.015** 0.013** -0.014**
(0.012) (0.015) (0.014) (0.014) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
ROA 0.084*** 0.095*** 0.087** 0.087** 0.004 0.048 0.030 0.031
(0.031) (0.033) (0.036) (0.037) (0.054) (0.057) (0.061) (0.061)
Capital Intensity -0.009 -0.006 -0.008 -0.009 -0.020 -0.017 -0.023 -0.024
(0.010) (0.010) (0.012) (0.012) (0.015) (0.015) (0.016) (0.016)
HHI 0.124* 0.151** 0.174** 0.171** -0.295* -0.408** -0.394** -0.392**
(0.074) (0.074) (0.075) (0.075) (0.151) (0.158) (0.160) (0.160)
Tangibility 0.017 0.013 0.018 0.011 0.489*** 0.519*** 0.510*** 0.500***
(0.061) (0.063) (0.066) (0.066) (0.118) (0.118) (0.117) (0.117)
Average efficiency 0.011 0.007 0.007 0.102 -0.027 -0.055* -0.051 0.050
(0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.064) (0.035) (0.032) (0.032) (0.051)
Relative efficiency -0.039 0.018 -0.017 -0.016 0.107* 0.091 0.095* 0.086
(0.052) (0.054) (0.054) (0.053) (0.057) (0.055) (0.055) (0.054)
Age 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.001
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
BG Affiliation -0.019** -0.025*** -0.026*** -0.025*** -0.013 -0.020 -0.022 -0.022
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.015) (0.014) (0.015) (0.015)
Inc. Total Cash -0.009*** -0.005 -0.005 -0.032*** -0.037*** -0.037***
(0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005)
BG Total Cash -0.007** -0.008*** -0.010*** -0.011***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.012)
BG Total Cash × Average Efficiency -0.006* -0.005
(0.003) (0.003)
Market & Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Sectoral trend NO NO NO NO YES YES YES YES
R-squared 0.584 0.599 0.602 0.602 0.417 0.457 0.467 0.468
N 2238 2099 2049 2049 2238 2099 2049 2049
Note: Age is the average age of all the firms active in market i at year t. See appendix A.1 for a detailed description of the variables. Average Efficiency is normalised
to have zero mean. Robust standard errors clustered at the 3SIC sector level in parentheses. One star denotes significance at the 10% level, two stars denote significance
at the 5% level, and three stars denote significance at the 1% level.
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Table 25: Business Group Liquidity And Entry: Alternative entry definitions
Entrants = New firms + firms at Entrants = New firms + firms at
second year of activity second and third year of activity
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Size -0.395*** -0.396*** -0.195*** -0.197***
(0.036) (0.035) (0.028) (0.029)
∆ Size 0.194*** 0.197*** 0.098*** 0.101***
(0.020) (0.020) (0.018) (0.018)
ROA 0.094** 0.102** 0.100** 0.111***
(0.044) (0.044) (0.042) (0.042)
Capital Intensity -0.013 -0.013 0.017 0.017
(0.018) (0.018) (0.015) (0.014)
HHI 0.043 0.036 0.267*** 0.259***
(0.082) (0.083) (0.097) (0.097)
Tangibility -0.056 -0.070 -0.049 -0.074
(0.072) (0.075) (0.082) (0.083)
Average Efficiency -0.027 0.044 0.002 -0.110**
(0.017) (0.034) (0.016) (0.037)
Relative Efficiency -0.003 0.003 -0.012 -0.005
(0.071) (0.071) (0.078) (0.079)
BG Affiliation -0.125*** -0.123*** -0.408*** -0.403***
(0.046) (0.045) (0.050) (0.049)
Inc. Total Cash -0.002 -0.002 -0.029*** -0.028***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.008) (0.008)
BG Total Cash -0.008** -0.009*** -0.011*** -0.012***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
BG Total Cash × Average Efficiency -0.005*** -0.007***
(0.002) (0.002)
Market & Year FE YES YES YES YES
R-squared 0.515 0.518 0.397 0.404
N 2004 2004 1992 1992
Note: This table re-estimates our basic entry equation using different definitions of entrants. In columns 1
and 2, entrants are defined as firms that appear at time t plus all firms that appeared at time t − 1 and that
are active at time t. In columns 3 and 4 we define as entrants also firms that appeared at time t − 2 and
are active at time t. Incumbent firms are re-defined accordingly. Based on the new definitions of entrants
and incumbents we have re-computed entry rates and the variables BG Affiliation, Average Efficiency, Relative
Efficiency, Incumbent Total Cash, BG Total Cash. In the estimations displayed in this table we use the same
observations that were used for the baseline specification of Table 10. Results are qualitatively the same when
we estimate our entry equation without imposing such a restriction. Average Efficiency is normalised to have
zero mean. See appendix A.1 for a detailed description of the variables. Robust standard errors clustered at the
3SIC sector level in parentheses. One star denotes significance at the 10% level, two stars denote significance
at the 5% level, and three stars denote significance at the 1% level.
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